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SEX EXCEPTIONALISM IN INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY 
 





The state has long attempted to regulate sexual activity through a combina-
tion of criminal and civil sanctions and the award of benefits, such as marriage 
and First Amendment protections, for acts and speech that conform with the 
state’s vision of acceptable sex.1 These regulatory efforts contribute to our so-
ciety’s construction of sex. The law’s construction of sex has largely been a 
negative one, in which sex—unless it is in service to other state-approved goals 
(such as procreation or marital intimacy)—is devalued and feared. In particular, 
the law has contributed to a vision of sex that discounts sexual pleasure, female 
sexuality, homosexuality, and a variety of “non-conforming” sex interests, such 
as bondage/sadomasochism.2 Failure to challenge such constructions reinforces 
the “notion that sexual practices are innate or biological, rather than the product 
of social and cultural forces.”3 The law is therefore an important site of inter-
vention to expose and critique the construction of sex. Intellectual property (IP) 
laws, though not commonly considered in writing about the law’s construction 
of sex, play a role in perpetuating this often negative and limiting vision of sex.  
Sex has long played a role in determining the scope of IP protection, espe-
cially in the context of copyright and trademark law. At common law, works, 
 
* Professor of Law and Joseph Scott Fellow, Loyola Law School (Los Angeles), Loyola 
Marymount University. Copyright © 2012 by Jennifer E. Rothman and Board of Trustees of 
Leland Stanford Junior University. I thank the Stanford Law & Policy Review for asking me 
to participate in this symposium on the adult entertainment industry and for its thoughtful 
editing. I also thank Sarah Boyd, Douglas NeJaime, and Laura Rosenbury for their com-
ments and Lisa Schultz, Kellen Farnham, and Andrew Coyne for their research assistance. 
 1. For a developed analysis of these regulatory efforts and a survey of the relevant 
literature, see Laura A. Rosenbury & Jennifer E. Rothman, Sex in and out of Intimacy, 59 
EMORY L.J. 809 passim (2010). 
 2. Id. at 812-13. 
 3. Id. at 814. 
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inventions, and marks deemed sexually explicit or simply suggestive were de-
nied the protection of the law.4 Even today they remain disfavored in some 
contexts. Although the penalties for non-compliance with the state’s vision of 
appropriate sex are less severe in IP law than those, for example, in criminal or 
family law, IP law signals the state’s normative and exceptional views of sex. 
By sex exceptionalism I mean the way in which IP (and other laws) treat sex 
differently than other activities. This sex exceptionalism often exhibits a nega-
tive view of sex that either dismisses the value of sex or, worse yet, treats it as 
something harmful. This sex negativity can also manifest as sex normativity in 
which the state channels sex into preferred forms while excluding or penalizing 
other forms of sex. IP laws demonstrate all of these modes of engaging with 
sex—at times treating all sex as exceptional, as uniquely harmful, or simply 
valueless, and at other times valuing sex but favoring certain types of sex over 
others.  
IP law not only contributes to the legal construction of sex, but also has a 
particularly significant multiplying effect on the social construction of sex be-
cause IP law influences cultural artifacts, such as movies, books, plays, and 
products and services, that themselves shape our culture’s construction of sex. 
The parameters of IP law encourage creators, companies, and users into safe 
zones where they are more likely to get copyright protection, register a mark or 
benefit from fair use or other defenses to infringement and dilution. Thus, the 
law can stigmatize works and marks with sexual content or certain forms of 
sexual content, thereby contributing to the channeling of sex into limited ac-
ceptable forms. 
Instead of “recognizing the diversity of sexual and intimate relations wor-
thy of respect and protection,”5 courts often have imposed their views of what 
constitutes “good sex.” IP laws therefore harm individuals living both within 
and outside the legal construct of acceptable sex.6 For those who cannot con-
form, the legal and social disapproval can cause psychological and physical 
harm and negatively affect their relationship to themselves, their sexuality, and 
 
 4. See HORACE C. BALL, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 67-68, 
112-13, 720 (1944); RICHARD ROGERS BOWKER, COPYRIGHT, ITS HISTORY AND ITS LAW 86-87 
(1912); WILLIAM HENRY BROWNE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TRADE-MARKS 341-44, 481-
86, 607-08 (2d ed. 1898); EATON S. DRONE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN 
INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTIONS IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 181-98 (1879); 
HENRY ALBERT HINKSON, COPYRIGHT LAW 1-2, 8, 71 (1903); STEPHEN D. LAW, COPYRIGHT 
AND PATENT LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1790-1870, at 123 (1870); LEWIS BOYD 
SEBASTIAN, THE LAW OF TRADE MARKS AND THEIR REGISTRATION 397 (3d ed. 1890); 
ARTHUR W. WEIL, AMERICAN COPYRIGHT LAW 22, 195-96 (1917); Jeremy Phillips, Copy-
right in Obscene Works: Some British and American Problems, 6 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 138, 
138 (1977). 
 5. MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS AND THE ETHICS 
OF THE QUEER LIFE 36-37 (1999). 
 6. Rosenbury & Rothman, supra note 1, at 839. 
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their place in society.7 The laws also discourage some, who otherwise might 
wish to or would benefit from doing so, from departing from the dominant con-
struction of sex. IP laws therefore interfere with our ability to develop and em-
brace a more positive relationship to sex. 
In the context of this symposium on the adult entertainment industry,8 this 
sex exceptionalism and normativity reveal that the industry may fare worse in 
some IP disputes than other industries. But the scope of this project sweeps 
more broadly than the adult entertainment business and pornography. A con-
sideration of the treatment of sex in IP highlights some of the dangers of the 
differential treatment of sex in general and also some of the pitfalls of using the 
IP system to further goals unrelated to its core missions. Few, if any, scholars 
have made these connections. 
This Article will proceed in three Parts. First, I will consider trademark 
law’s explicit and implicit disfavoring of sexual content. Second, I will consid-
er copyright law’s putative move toward treating sexual content like all other 
content. Despite this narrative, I will point out some of the ways in which copy-
right law continues to treat works with sexual content differently than other 
works. Finally, I will situate this discussion in a broader critique of the law’s 
treatment of sex. I call for a greater awareness of sex exceptionalism and nor-
mativity, particularly in IP law, and its elimination. Works, marks, and uses of 
them should not be disfavored solely because they have sexual content, nor 
should courts be in the business of assessing what constitutes good or bad sex.
9
  
I.  TRADEMARK’S CONTINUED SEX NEGATIVITY 
Trademarks are symbols, words, designs, or other indicators of source that 
identify and distinguish the source of goods or services from those of others.10 
Trademark law prevents others (traditionally competitors) from using the same 
or similar marks to confuse consumers and from diluting the strength of anoth-
er’s mark. Trademark law both at common law and under the governing stat-
 
 7. Id. at 818, 839-43. 
 8. Although the “adult entertainment” industry is the label for the symposium and the 
one currently in vogue with people who work in what is sometimes called the pornography 
business, the term is unsatisfying. The bulk of entertainment for adults has very little to do 
with sexually explicit works. At the same time, the common alternative term, “pornogra-
phy,” is also problematic largely because the term has most often been used with pejorative 
connotations. To the extent that I use the term “pornography,” I intend it to mean—without a 
positive or negative connotation—a work that is sexually explicit and intended to stimulate a 
sexual response among readers, viewers, listeners and other consumers. 
  9. Although I critique normative judgments distinguishing between types of sex, this 
conclusion does not challenge distinctions courts make elsewhere about whether particular 
sex acts are consensual.  
 10. Technically, the term “trademark” only applies to marks used on goods, and the 
term “service mark” applies to marks used for services, but “trademark” is often used as an 
all-encompassing term, and I use it as such here. 
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utes has long scrutinized the “morality” of marks.11 Today, both federal and 
state laws deny registration to marks deemed “immoral” or “scandalous.”12 
Marks with sexual content often fall within these bars to registration. Trade-
mark law also disfavors sexual content when evaluating liability for trademark 
infringement and dilution. Findings of trademark dilution in particular often 
explicitly turn on whether a defendant’s use associates a mark with sex. In this 
Part, I will discuss each of these aspects of trademark law.  
A. Bars to Registration  
At common law there were prohibitions on the protection of marks deemed 
immoral or against public policy. Trademarks were also not protected if the un-
derlying products or businesses were themselves deemed immoral, obscene, or 
otherwise against public policy, even if the marks themselves were inoffensive. 
Many of these prohibitions have dissipated, but the longstanding refusal to reg-
ister marks deemed immoral or scandalous continues today.13 The governing 
Lanham Act explicitly denies federal registration to marks if they “consist[] of 
or comprise[] immoral . . . or scandalous matter.”14 Most states also deny regis-
tration to marks deemed immoral or scandalous.15 Even though trademark in-
fringement under state and federal laws can be established if a mark is not reg-
istered, registration (federal registration, in particular) provides many benefits 
for mark holders, including nationwide priority if a mark is federally regis-
tered.16  
The Lanham Act does not define what constitutes an “immoral” or “scan-
dalous” mark. Because what is “immoral” is difficult to assess, examining at-
torneys at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and courts have of-
 
 11. See BROWNE, supra note 4, at 341-44, 481-86, 607-08 (noting that “lawful trade-
marks” cannot “transgress[] the rules of morality or public policy” and that marks must meet 
certain standards of “propriety” and cannot “shock[]” the “sensibilities” of the public); 
SEBASTIAN, supra note 4, at 397 (describing the longstanding principle that the government 
could deny registration to marks that were “contrary to law or morality”). 
 12. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2006); see infra note 15. 
 13. I note that because a mark is viewed in the context of the market some evaluation 
of the underlying product or service undoubtedly continues to occur. See In re Boulevard 
Entm’t, Inc., 334 F.3d 1336, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 14. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2006). The statute also prohibits the registration of deceptive 
and disparaging marks, among other prohibitions. Id. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) reviews applications and determines whether the marks meet the criteria for regis-
tration. 
 15. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-25-3(a) (West 2011); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.      
§ 19.77.020(1)(a) (West 2011); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 47-2-2(1) (West 2011). 
 16. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1057(c), 1115 (2006). Both the federal and state registries 
allow businesses to stake out geographic territory and to facilitate their marks being easily 
located and thereby avoided by other businesses developing new trade names, logos, and 
other marks. Federal registry provides numerous other benefits as well. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C.          
§§ 1057(c), 1065, 1072, 1111, 1115 (2006). 
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ten treated the exclusions for immoral and scandalous marks as the same.17 
Courts and the USPTO have defined something as scandalous if it is “shocking 
to the sense of propriety, offensive to the conscience or moral feelings, or call-
ing out for condemnation.”18 Marks are also deemed scandalous if they are 
simply “vulgar.” A mark is vulgar if it is “lacking in taste, indelicate, [or] mor-
ally crude.”19 The meaning of the mark is determined by the contemporary un-
derstanding of the word and contemporary attitudes.20 Even though what is 
scandalous or immoral is to be judged from the perspective of a substantial 
composite of the public,21 the analysis leaves much room for the personal bias-
es of examining attorneys and judges to form the basis of a denial of registra-
tion. Moreover, the decision is most often made by a sole attorney at the 
USPTO. The examining attorneys are the ones who make the initial determina-
tions of eligibility for registration, and their decisions (unless appealed) are fi-
nal. Many rejections are not appealed to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board 
(TTAB) (the administrative body that reviews decisions of the examining attor-
neys), and even fewer are appealed from the TTAB to the Federal Circuit or 
federal district courts. Thus, many more marks are denied registration than it 
appears from the number of published appeals of these rejections.  
The list of absurd and contradictory decisions of what constitutes a scan-
dalous or immoral mark by the TTAB, the Federal Circuit, and other courts is 
long and not entirely reconcilable.22 Nevertheless, one can glean some insights 
from reading these decisions together. The three dominant categories of marks 
deemed scandalous or immoral are those that refer to a specific religion in the 
context of selling a forbidden item under that religion’s precepts (such as Ko-
ran as a mark for wine),23 marks referring to defecation or urination, and marks 
 
 17. See TMEP § 1203.01 (7th ed. Oct. 2010) (citing In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 
486 (C.C.P.A. 1981)). The USPTO publishes the U.S. Trademark Manual of Examining 
Procedure (TMEP). This publication provides guidance to examining attorneys based on the 
USPTO’s interpretation of the relevant statutes and case law. 
 18.  Id.; see also In re Boulevard, 334 F.3d at 1339 (using an “offensiveness” standard 
for determining scandalousness). 
 19. TMEP § 1203.01 (citing In re Runsdorf, 171 U.S.P.Q. 443, 444 (T.T.A.B. 1971)). 
 20. Such attitudes will change over time but are to be judged from the time of registra-
tion. See In re Boulevard, 334 F.3d at 1340. This could mean that a first-comer could be de-
nied registration, while a subsequent registrant would be able to register the mark if percep-
tions of the mark changed in the intervening time period and the senior user has a 
geographically limited reach or is no longer in business.  
 21. I note that some courts have suggested that only potential purchasers should count, 
but most courts and the USPTO have considered consumers more generally. 
 22. The Federal Circuit hears most challenges to denials of registration, although such 
challenges can also be brought in district courts. 
 23. See In re Lebanese Arak Corp., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d 1215 (T.T.A.B. 2010); see also In 
re Riverbank Canning, 95 F.2d 327 (C.C.P.A. 1938) (affirming the denial of registration of 
Madonna as a mark for wine). 
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referring to sex.24 Given the topic of this symposium, I will focus only on the 
last category.  
Familiarity with the rulings denying registration on the basis of references 
to sex or sexual organs leads to several conclusions. First, marks showing actu-
al nudity or drawings that depict genitalia are likely to be denied registration. 
For example, the USPTO rejected the use of a photograph of a naked man and 
woman to identify a swingers group (referring to sexual partner switching, not 
to hipsters or the dancing style) and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals 
(the predecessor to the Federal Circuit) affirmed the rejection.25 In contrast, a 
logo was registered for a product that purportedly lengthened penises that in-
cluded a drawing of a naked man staring at his penis. In reversing the examin-
ing attorney’s initial rejection of the logo, the TTAB emphasized that the penis 
itself was not shown (what the man was looking at was left to the imagination). 
The TTAB also noted that drawings of naked people are more favorably 
viewed than photographic depictions.26  
Gender and sex discrimination also seep into USPTO adjudications. As 
discussed, references and depictions of genitalia are disfavored; however, ref-
erences to male genitalia seem to fare better than those to female anatomy. For 
example, Big Pecker for t-shirts was registered,27 but Bearded Clam for a res-
taurant was not because of its purported reference to female genitalia.28 Pussy 
for a drink was denied registration,29 while Cocktales for entertainment ser-
vices was registered after an initial denial.30 Despite this apparent preference 
for penises, references to male genitalia also can lead to denials of registration. 
For example, when an applicant sought to register Sex Rod for clothing in an 
athletic font similar to that used by the Boston Red Sox baseball team, the ap-
plication was denied. The TTAB concluded that the term was a “vulgar” refer-
ence to the penis with “lurid” and “offensive” connotations.31 The TTAB also 
supported barring registration because the mark was deemed to disparage the 
baseball team by associating it with an “overtly sexual mark.”32  
 
 24. I note that swear words could form a fourth category but largely are composed of 
words that refer either to the same disfavored bodily functions or sex or sexual organs. I 
therefore treat these as encompassed within my enumerated categories. 
 25. In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481 (C.C.P.A. 1981). 
 26. In re Thomas Labs., Inc., 189 U.S.P.Q. 50, 50-52 (T.T.A.B. 1975) (“It must be 
emphasized that applicant’s mark is not a photograph of a nude male figure, but is rather a 
cartoon[] . . . .”).  
 27. In re Hershey, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1470 (T.T.A.B. 1988) (reversing the denial of regis-
tration). 
 28. In re Douglas, 2004 WL 2202264 (T.T.A.B. Sept. 7, 2004). 
 29. In re Shearer, 2009 WL 4073515 (T.T.A.B. May 14, 2009). 
 30. In re Mackman, 2011 WL 810206 (T.T.A.B. Feb. 9, 2011). 
 31. Bos. Red Sox Baseball Club, Ltd. v. Sherman, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d 1581, 1588 
(T.T.A.B. 2008). 
 32. Id. at 1589-90. 
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Solo sex has also been disfavored in the registration process. The Federal 
Circuit, in In re Boulevard Entertainment, Inc., recently upheld the denial of 
registration for the marks 1-800-JACK-OFF and JACK-OFF in connection 
with a phone sex line.33 The Federal Circuit relied on the examining attorney’s 
review of dictionary definitions of the term “jack-off” that indicated that it was 
“vulgar.”34 Surveys were not used to demonstrate whether a substantial compo-
site of the public, let alone potential customers, would find the term immoral or 
scandalous. As sexual slang goes the verb to “jack off” is pretty tame. In fact, at 
least one dictionary has expressly noted that the term is no longer vulgar and 
has “now become acceptable in speech, although some older or more conserva-
tive people may object to its use.”35 
Although the denial of the registration was based on the term to “jack off,” 
the Federal Circuit may also have been influenced by disapproval of the under-
lying business—a sex chat line that facilitated and encouraged solo sex.36 It is 
uncertain whether the USPTO would register 1-800-MASTRB8 for a similar 
service. If it would, then that would demonstrate the absurdity of the inquiry 
and the types of distinctions being made. Why should it matter if we refer to 
masturbation by a clinical term or by a more colloquial term such as “to jack 
off”? If the USPTO would not register 1-800-MASTRB8 on the grounds that it 
was immoral or scandalous,37 then that would demonstrate that the opposition 
is not based on mere vulgarity, but on a broader opposition to masturbation.  
The odds of registering a sexually suggestive (or even explicit) mark in-
crease if a registrant can come up with an alternative definition of the mark—
 
 33. In re Boulevard Entm’t, Inc., 334 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 34. Id. at 1339-43. 
 35. COLLINS ENGLISH DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2009), available at http://dictionary 
.reference.com/browse/jack+off. The federal judiciary may well be composed of many of 
these “older and more conservative people.” As Judge Richard Posner has noted “judges 
know next to nothing about sex beyond their own personal experience, which is limited, per-
haps more so than average, because people with irregular sex lives are pretty much . . . 
screened out of the judiciary.” RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 1 (1992). This reality 
may make the judiciary particularly conservative on matters of sex.  
 36. In other areas of the law, we have seen a disfavoring of solo sex. See, e.g., Wil-
liams v. Pryor, 240 F.3d 944, 949 (11th Cir. 2001), aff’d after remand and appeal sub nom. 
Williams v. Att’y Gen., 378 F.3d 1232, 1234-38 (11th Cir. 2004) (upholding the constitu-
tionality of an Alabama statute that banned the distribution and possession of sex toys be-
cause they promote “prurient interests in autonomous sex” and “the pursuit of orgasms by 
artificial means for their own sake”). Although the Fifth Circuit disagreed with Williams, 
concluding that a similar ban on sex toys was unconstitutional, it rooted its analysis in a vi-
sion of sex toy use that promoted relationships rather than solo sex. See Reliable Consult-
ants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 742-47 (5th Cir. 2008); see also Rosenbury & Rothman, 
supra note 1, at 832-33. 
 37. I note that the USPTO potentially could deny registration of such a mark on the 
grounds that the mark is generic or descriptive without having achieved secondary meaning. 
I assume for purposes of this discussion, however, that the mark would be deemed sugges-
tive. 
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no matter how unbelievable or tangential.38 Black Tail, as a mark for a porno-
graphic magazine focused on sexual depictions of African-American women, 
was initially denied registration both by the examining attorney and TTAB be-
cause it referred to a colloquial term for a sexual partner (as in a piece of 
“tail”).39 The Federal Circuit reversed because there was an alternative non-
vulgar meaning referring to a woman’s buttocks.40 How referring to a woman’s 
buttocks in the context of a porn magazine is less sexual or scandalous than re-
ferring to her as a sexual partner is confounding. The willingness to consider 
such alternatives, however, is unpredictable. In the rejection of the Bearded 
Clam registration for a seafood restaurant, the USPTO rejected registration on 
the basis that the name was a vulgar reference to female genitalia,41 even 
though there was a compelling and highly relevant alternative meaning in the 
seafood world—the term indicates a clam with algae on it. It seems that the dis-
favoring of female genitalia trumped the availability of an alternative meaning 
of the word. 
I do not intend to suggest that all marks with sexual content are denied reg-
istration. The above examples demonstrate as much. Despite what could be 
viewed as an anti-solo-sex position by the Federal Circuit in In re Boulevard, 
there are many examples of registered marks for sex toys that have sexually 
suggestive names; for example, Mega Masturbator, X-Spot, Vibrating Vagina, 
and In Like Flynt (granted with permission of Hustler owner, Larry Flynt). The 
contradictory and confusing determinations about the registrability of marks 
with sexual content are possible because of the explicit bar to registering marks 
deemed immoral or scandalous. These prohibitions frequently bar the registra-
tion of marks with sexual content and, in such instances, signal that sex is 
something to be viewed negatively, hidden from public view, and that some 
types of sex and ways of talking about sex are preferred by the state, while oth-
ers are disfavored. This signaling participates in the construction of sex and 
channels sex into certain preferred forms that are limiting and discriminatory.  
B. Infringement 
Outside of the registration system, courts have been influenced by sex neg-
ativity and normativity in ways that strongly disfavor defendants who use 
marks (or anything that evokes a mental association with another’s mark) in the 
context of sex. To establish trademark infringement under federal and state 
laws, a plaintiff must establish that consumers are likely to be confused as to 
 
 38. See, e.g., In re Ava Watkins, WL 548042 (T.T.A.B. Feb. 8, 2005) (reversing the 
USPTO’s rejection of a registration for Twatty Girl as a mark for a comic strip, but only be-
cause the Board believed that the mark could be interpreted as referring to something other 
than female anatomy). 
 39. In re Mavety Media Grp., 33 F.3d 1367, 1368-70 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
 40. Id. at 1373-75. 
 41. In re Douglas, WL 2202264 (T.T.A.B. Sept. 7, 2004). 
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the source, sponsorship or affiliation of the product or service because a de-
fendant has used the same or a similar mark on its own goods or in connection 
with those goods or its services.42 Courts use a number of factors to evaluate 
whether consumers are likely to be confused. These “likelihood of confusion” 
factors differ in number in different federal circuits.43 Not only does the num-
ber of factors vary from circuit to circuit, but so does the content of those fac-
tors. One could engage in a much broader critique of these likelihood of confu-
sion factors, which are not provided by the statute and often seem wholly 
unrelated to the critical question of whether confusion is actually likely, but 
putting that aside, sexual content is particularly vulnerable to the vagaries of 
courts applying these factors. The use of disaggregated likelihood of confusion 
factors itself makes discrimination against uses in a sexual context more likely. 
Rather than evaluating broadly whether consumers are likely to think a 
markholder is involved—something that is less likely in a sexual context—
courts look at each factor in isolation. 
Many of the likelihood of confusion factors are shared between different 
circuits and several of these factors have disfavored uses of marks in a sexual 
context. In particular, four of the common likelihood of confusion factors have 
been wielded against defendants in the context of sex. I consider each of these 
factors in more detail. The first likelihood of confusion factor that I will con-
sider is the competitive proximity of the goods or services. The more proximate 
the two products are, the more likely it is that consumers will be confused be-
cause the products/services will be sold in the same markets to the same con-
sumers. When evaluating this factor, courts consider the likelihood of expan-
sion of the trademark holder into other markets. In the context of sex, courts 
have sometimes interpreted competitive proximity quite broadly. One district 
court, for example, concluded that even though the defendant and plaintiff were 
selling different services and targeting different markets, the plaintiff and de-
fendant were competitors because of the possibility that the defendant (who had 
made a sexually suggestive use) would divert the consumers from the mark 
holder’s product.44 Courts also improperly bring in tarnishment concerns, 
which are tangential to the relevant inquiry of market proximity. Courts point 
to the possibility that consumers will develop a negative association with the 
product as a result of the defendant’s use of a mark (or something similar) in a 
sexual context and then assume that this tarnishment could affect sales. Using 
 
 42. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006). 
 43. Compare, e.g., Sally Beauty Co. v. Beautyco, Inc., 304 F.3d 964, 972 (10th Cir. 
2002) (describing the Tenth Circuit’s six-factor test), with Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 
1322, 1326-27 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (enumerating the thirteen factors used by the Federal Circuit 
and USPTO to determine likelihood of confusion). 
 44. Pfizer, Inc. v. Sachs, 652 F. Supp. 2d 512, 522 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). The use in Pfizer 
might well have been confusing (as to sponsorship); however, my point is not to challenge 
the legitimacy of the holding in this particular case, but instead to point out the counterintui-
tive and exceptional analysis of the proximate-market analysis.  
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convoluted logic, some courts then conclude that such an effect could only oc-
cur if the products were in competitive proximity.45  
 Another likelihood of confusion factor that allows courts to wield their an-
ti-pornography, anti-sex predilections is the consideration of the quality of the 
defendant’s product. If a defendant’s goods or services are of low quality, some 
courts will weigh the factor in favor of a likelihood of confusion.46 When 
courts focus on the quality of the products or services, those with sexual con-
tent have sometimes been deemed of “low” or “poor” quality on the basis that 
they are sexual.47 Such conclusions weigh in favor of likely confusion and also 
reflect negative views of sex and of those who consume works, products, and 
services of a sexual nature. 
Some courts also consider a factor that evaluates the sophistication of pur-
chasers and the price of the product. Higher priced goods likely have more dis-
cerning customers who are less likely to be confused. In the context of pornog-
raphy, a number of courts have suggested that porn consumers are less 
discerning than others and therefore more easily confused (and “diverted”).48  
Another relevant likelihood of confusion factor that courts consider is the 
intent of the defendant in adopting or using the relevant mark or something 
similar to it. Consideration of the defendant’s intent often works against de-
fendants in the context of sexually suggestive or explicit uses. Although the 
traditional analysis focuses on whether a defendant sought to confuse consum-
ers (or sometimes simply to adopt a similar mark),49 some courts (even outside 
of the context of sex) conclude that knowledge of the plaintiff’s mark itself 
demonstrates bad faith and malicious intent.50 In the context of sex, courts have 
concluded that simply trying to profit from an association with another’s mark 
is enough to show likelihood of confusion even if there is no other evidence or 
 
 45. See, e.g., Pfizer, 652 F. Supp. 2d at 522. 
 46. See Imagineering, Inc. v. Van Klassens, Inc., 53 F.3d 1260, 1265 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
But see Savin Corp. v. Savin Grp., 391 F.3d 439, 460-61 (2d Cir. 2004) (suggesting that low 
quality goods produced by defendants will signal that the goods are not those of the plain-
tiff’s thereby reducing the likelihood of confusion, but potentially increasing the likelihood 
of dilution). Putting aside issues of sex, this factor deserves critique because it revolves 
around questions of harm, rather than likely confusion—thereby putting the cart before the 
horse. 
 47. See, e.g., Pfizer, 652 F. Supp. 2d at 523-24 (citing with approval Dall. Cowboys 
Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 205 (2d Cir. 1979)). 
 48. See, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commcn’s Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1028 
(9th Cir. 2004). 
 49. 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§ 23:113 (4th ed. 2011). 
 50. See, e.g., PACCAR, Inc. v. TeleScan Techs., L.L.C., 319 F.3d 243, 254 (6th Cir. 
2003); Pfizer, 652 F. Supp. 2d at 523 (suggesting that knowledge of the plaintiff’s mark is 
sufficient in the context of a sexually suggestive use to demonstrate bad faith); Dall. Cow-
boys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 467 F. Supp. 366, 374-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) 
(concluding that the deliberate adoption of plaintiff’s mark without regard to the intent to 
confuse is evidence of a likelihood of confusion in the context of a pornographic film). 
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indication of likely confusion.51 I have criticized elsewhere this more general 
movement to consider infringing any effort to profit from non-confusing asso-
ciations with others’ marks,52 but some judges have been particularly critical of 
defendants making such associations in the context of the pornography busi-
ness. 
The overall ad hoc balancing of these likelihood of confusion factors gives 
courts great latitude to bootstrap in other considerations unrelated to likelihood 
of confusion, such as possible tarnishment of the trademark. Such considera-
tions arose more frequently in infringement discussions before an amendment 
to the Lanham Act provided for an express cause of action for dilution. Now 
that there is such a provision, courts most often consider tarnishment under di-
lution analysis.  
Also working against defendants is the fact that courts often make determi-
nations about the likelihood of confusion in the context of motions for prelimi-
nary injunctions in which courts focus heavily on the severity of the harm to the 
plaintiff even when the likelihood of confusion is admittedly minimal.53 In 
these cases the harm of being associated with sex is deemed significant and can 
weigh heavily in the plaintiff’s favor.54 Often, after preliminary injunction rul-
ings, cases are either dropped or settled, so these initial decisions are very in-
fluential.  
Not only have courts been more likely to find a likelihood of confusion in 
the context of sex, but they also have disfavored the panoply of defenses to in-
fringement when defendants have used marks (or colorable imitations) in a 
sexual context. Descriptive fair use is both a statutory and common law defense 
to trademark infringement that protects defendants from liability when they are 
not using the plaintiff’s mark (or something similar) as a mark but instead to 
describe the features of a defendant’s own product or service.55 A referential or 
nominative fair use is a court-created doctrine that protects uses of another’s 
mark that identify the plaintiff’s goods or services, rather than those of the de-
fendant.56 Both descriptive and nominative fair use serve to protect First 
 
 51. See, e.g., Dall. Cowboys, 467 F. Supp. at 377. 
 52. Jennifer E. Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion: Standing at the Crossroads of 
Trademark Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 105 passim (2005). 
 53. See, e.g., Dall. Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinemas, 604 F.2d 200, 
206-07 (2d Cir. 1979); Dall. Cowboys, 467 F. Supp. at 377-78.  
 54. See, e.g., Dall. Cowboys, 604 F.2d at 204-07; Barbecue Marx, Inc. v. 551 Ogden, 
Inc., 110 F. Supp. 2d 689 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (holding that playing adult films in a restaurant 
called Bone Daddy was sufficient to establish likely confusion in context of balancing harm 
to plaintiff’s Smoke Daddy mark), rev’d, 235 F.3d 1041 (7th Cir. 2000) (reversing on 
grounds that there was no likelihood of confusion but not commenting on the dilution con-
clusion or balancing of harms). 
 55. See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(4) (2006); 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 49, at § 11:45. 
 56. New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 
1992). Although most courts now accept some form of a nominative fair use defense, some 
circuits still have not done so. See, e.g., PACCAR Inc. v. TeleScan Techs., L.L.C., 319 F.3d 
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Amendment values, but courts also consider separate First Amendment argu-
ments in trademark cases. If a work is a parody, for example, courts usually 
conclude that the First Amendment protects a defendant from liability for 
trademark infringement (or dilution).  
The most prominent example of an alleged use of a plaintiff’s mark being 
found infringing as a result of its use in a sexual context is the Second Circuit’s 
decision in Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd.57 The 
court upheld a preliminary injunction against the defendants to prevent them 
from distributing and exhibiting a sexually-explicit film in which the main 
character, Debbie, briefly wears a uniform similar to that of the Dallas team’s 
cheerleaders’ uniforms. The same uniform was used in the posters for the film 
and the advertising misleadingly suggested that the lead, Bambi Woods, was a 
former Texas Cowgirl, a term sometimes used to refer to the Dallas Cowboys 
Cheerleaders. (See Figure 1 below.)  
 
















Putting aside complaints about the advertising, the court considered the use 
of the uniform in the film infringing. The court suggested that the use of a 
cheerleader outfit similar to those of the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders and al-
leged references to the cheerleaders were likely infringing.59 The court’s ani-
mosity toward the film was explicit—it described the film as “gross,” “revolt-
 
243, 256 (6th Cir. 2003) (“This circuit has never followed the nominative fair use analysis 
. . . . We are not inclined to adopt the [nominative fair use analysis] here.”).  
 57. 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979).  
 58. Photograph of original one-sheet movie poster displayed for sale by 
CineMasterpieces. Virtual Gallery, CINEMASTERPIECES, 
http://www.cinemasterpieces.com/cine_D .htm#debbie. 
 59. Dall. Cowboys, 604 F.2d at 202-07. 
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ing,” and “sexually depraved.”60 The court held that there was infringement be-
cause of the negative “association” with the Dallas Cowboys and the likelihood 
that people would think the Cowboys “sponsored the movie, provided some of 
the actors, licensed defendants to use the uniform, or was in some other way 
connected with the production.”61 There was little to no evidence supporting 
such an association by consumers; given the quality and nature of the film, it is 
hard to imagine how anyone could think that the Dallas Cowboys were in-
volved with the project. The court did not review the likelihood of confusion 
factors in detail but instead suggested that “trademark laws are designed not on-
ly to prevent consumer confusion but also to protect ‘the synonymous right of a 
trademark owner to control his product’s reputation.’”62 Thus, the concern was 
harm to reputation, not harm to consumers who may have been misled. The 
confusion holding was based on this alleged tarnishment rather than the statuto-
rily required demonstration of likely confusion.  
The court in Dallas Cowboys rejected arguments that the use of the uni-
form was a descriptive or referential/nominative fair use or that it was a use 
protected by the First Amendment. The court dismissed the possibility that 
Debbie Does Dallas was a parody and that it was commenting on the Dallas 
Cowboys or the team’s cheerleaders. The plot of the film centers on Debbie’s 
efforts to raise money to get to Texas where she will cheer with the “Texas 
Cowgirls.” When the movie was made, the Dallas Cowboys were one of, if not 
the most dominant teams in football, and its cheerleaders were so well-known 
that they were definitional of cheerleading itself.63 It therefore made sense to 
have Debbie going to perform with them (although, I note that the film never 
actually mentions the Cowboys or Dallas or shows her going anywhere). At 
that time there could have been no prize more sought after for an aspiring 
cheerleader than to become a Dallas Cowboys Cheerleader. Similarly, during 
that era, if someone was going to have a sexual fantasy about cheerleaders, it 
likely would have centered around the Dallas Cowboys’ cheerleaders.  
It thus seems a referential/nominative use, rather than an exploitative one, 
to have a male character, who wished he had been a quarterback, request that 
Debbie wear a Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders’ costume. The court did not think 
such a reference was necessary, however, and deemed the message of Debbie 
 
 60. Id. at 202, 205. Experts in the field describe the film as rather tame compared to 
today’s pornography and as being a full-fledged narrative film that happened to also have 
sex. The main character only has sex once, in the final sequence of the film. At the time, 
however, Debbie Does Dallas was one of the first major full-length pornographic films to be 
distributed and therefore may well have been shocking to the judges. See DEBBIE DOES 
DALLAS: UNCOVERED (New Video Grp. 2005).  
 61. Dall. Cowboys, 604 F.2d at 205. 
 62. Id. (citing James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of the Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 274 
(7th Cir. 1976)). 
 63. See Christopher Kelly, Porn Yesterday: Debbie Does Dallas Turns Thirty, TEX. 
MONTHLY, July 2008, at 48 (contextualizing Debbie Does Dallas and discussing its com-
mentary on the Dallas Cowboys). 
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Does Dallas “barely discernible.”64 The court concluded that the filmmakers 
could comment on sexuality in athletics without actually referring to the plain-
tiff’s trademarks.65 But could they comment on the Dallas Cowboys Cheer-
leaders without making such an explicit reference? I do not think so. IP law and 
trademark law should not stand as an obstacle to people, including pornog-
raphers, documenting and describing the world around them—a world that in-
cludes football teams and cheerleaders who have names that are trademarked.66  
Moreover, a colorable argument could be made that the movie did provide 
a revealing (even if unintentional) commentary on the Dallas Cowboys Cheer-
leaders. In real life, the cheerleaders were sexualized by the team and players 
both on and off the field. They were obligated to wear short shorts, tall white 
go-go boots, and vests and shirts that revealed ample cleavage—and (at least 
for some) likely evoked go-go dancers and strip club culture. There also were 
undoubtedly physical requirements for the cheerleaders.67 By making this 
sexualization explicit, Debbie Does Dallas was simply calling a spade a 
spade.68  
In a more mainstream film, the filmmakers would have been given more 
latitude to use others’ trademarks and to refer to and comment on the real 
world.
69
 Consider for sake of comparison the 1979 dramatic film North Dallas 
Forty. North Dallas Forty was based on a novel of the same name that was a 
semi-fictionalized account of the author Peter Gent’s time playing in the NFL 
for the Dallas Cowboys. It was abundantly clear that the team depicted in the 
film was the Dallas Cowboys, even though the film changed the name of the 
team, and the uniforms were not identical to those of the Cowboys.70  
Although no lawsuit, as far as I am aware, was filed against North Dallas 
Forty, if the Cowboys had sued the makers of North Dallas Forty, a court 
would likely have dismissed infringement and dilution claims or have credited 
a First Amendment defense. This would have been so even if the film had used 
identical uniforms and been much more explicit about its reference to the Cow-
boys.71 The comparison between the films is therefore instructive because it 
 
 64. Dall. Cowboys, 604 F.2d at 206. 
 65. Id. 
 66. For a discussion of this issue in the context of copyright law, see Jennifer E. 
Rothman, Liberating Copyright: Thinking Beyond Free Speech, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 463 
passim (2010). 
 67. DEBBIE DOES DALLAS: UNCOVERED, supra note 60. 
 68. Id. 
 69. See, e.g., Caterpillar, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 287 F. Supp. 2d 913 (C.D. Ill. 2003); 
Univ. of Notre Dame du Lac v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 256 N.Y.S.2d 301 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1965), aff’d, 15 N.Y.2d 940 (N.Y. App. Div. 1965). 
 70. I note that the filmmakers and Gent likely “fictionalized” the team to avoid defa-
mation suits, rather than trademark claims. 
 71. See Dall. Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 467 F. Supp. 366, 
375-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (distinguishing Univ. of Notre Dame du Lac v. Twentieth Century-
Fox Film Corp., 256 N.Y.S.2d 301 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965), aff’d, 15 N.Y.2d 940 (N.Y. App. 
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demonstrates a locus of sex exceptionalism and negativity. North Dallas Forty 
likely did much more damage to the Dallas Cowboys’ image and reputation 
than Debbie Does Dallas did. In North Dallas Forty, the team owners and 
coaches are ruthless, and the players abuse drugs and women. The movie in-
cludes sexual references, contains coarse language, and shows male and female 
nudity but does not show genitalia or actual intercourse. Debbie Does Dallas, 
by contrast, is not about the team or its cheerleaders at all and made no claim to 
depict anything about the team or its cheerleaders. The movie does not even 
take place in Dallas, and Debbie has no interaction with anyone from the team. 
The likely discrepancy in predicted outcomes suggests that harm to reputation 
is not the real issue but instead the disfavoring of sex when there is little pur-
pose other than the sex to the underlying work. Sex for sex’s sake holds no val-
ue in the law. 
This comparison also demonstrates another locus in which courts are dis-
tinguishing between types of sex—sexual suggestiveness is favored over actual 
sex, and heterosexual sex is preferred over solo sex and sex with more than one 
other person. Debbie Does Dallas contains scenes of masturbation, sex scenes 
with more than two people, and some same-sex sexual activity. Thus, more 
than simply the graphic nature of the sex likely led the court to view it as 
“gross” and “revolting.”72  
Although subsequent courts have explained the Dallas Cowboys decision 
by suggesting that there was an express attempt to free ride rather than simply 
to use a trademark or trade dress in a movie, this explanation is unconvincing.73 
Free riding itself is not a basis for trademark infringement or else a much 
broader swath of uses would be infringing. Instead, the likelihood of confusion 
standard is the primary determinant of infringement.  
To remedy this disconnect subsequent courts have mostly treated Dallas 
Cowboys as a dilution case that took place before the enactment of federal dilu-
tion law. Several courts, however, continue to cite the case as good law, sup-
porting the proposition that using a mark (or something similar to it) in a sex-
ually explicit context weighs in favor of a likelihood of confusion finding and 
against a First Amendment defense.74 Regardless of the doctrinal hook, the real 
 
Div. 1965), a case that recognized the First Amendment interests of a “fictional movie about 
Notre Dame University and its football team”). 
 72. Dall. Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinemas, 604 F.2d 200, 202 (2d Cir. 
1979). 
 73. See, e.g., Caterpillar, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 2d at 913 (describing why the appearance 
of Caterpillar vehicles in a Disney film was not infringing, but the appearance of costumes 
similar to the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleader uniforms in a pornographic film was). 
 74. See, e.g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Sachs, 652 F. Supp. 2d 512, 523-24 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (cit-
ing Dallas Cowboys in context of sex to support likelihood of confusion finding); Kraft 
Foods Holdings, Inc. v. Helm, 205 F. Supp. 2d 942, 953-54 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (citing Dallas 
Cowboys with approval in context of rejecting a First Amendment defense to a use of a simi-
lar mark in a sexual context); see also Famous Horse, Inc. v. 5th Ave. Photo, Inc., 624 F.3d 
106, 109 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Dallas Cowboys for its likelihood of confusion analysis); To-
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complaint in Dallas Cowboys was that the public might develop a negative as-
sociation with the Dallas Cowboys because of the defendant’s use of its mark. 
This is the harm of dilution. As I will next consider, dilution often has been an 
outlet for courts to express their antipathy to sex and, to the extent that they 
permit sexual depictions, to prefer certain types of sex over others that do not 
conform to the law’s vision of “good sex.” 
C. Dilution as a Proxy for Sex Negativity 
The dilution of a mark is the whittling away of its strength by others’ use 
of the mark or something similar to it that causes an association with the mark. 
Dilution can occur and be actionable without regard to whether a use is likely 
to confuse consumers as to source, sponsorship, or affiliation. Two forms of 
dilution are usually recognized: The first is dilution by blurring—in which 
multiple associations with a single mark are likely to reduce the selling power 
of the senior mark. The other form of dilution and the one of the most relevance 
here is dilution by tarnishment. The Lanham Act defines dilution by 
tarnishment as an “association arising from the similarity between a mark or 
trade name and a famous mark that harms the reputation of the famous 
mark.”75 Reputational harm is often presumed when a mark is used in a sexual 
context.76 
Dilution law has long been controversial, especially on the national stage.77 
There was no federal dilution law until the passage of the Federal Trademark 
Dilution Act in 1995. Because dilution law does not turn on whether consumers 
are likely to be confused, it primarily serves to control what a mark signifies. 
This raises free speech and substantive due process concerns. It also furthers 
the interests of markholders instead of consumers, who were viewed as the 
primary (though not the sole) focus of federal trademark law prior to passage of 
the Federal Trademark Dilution Act. The evaluation of uses of marks in a sexu-
al context not only highlights the disparate treatment that sex receives in IP cir-
cles, but also provides additional ammunition for questioning dilution’s legiti-
macy. 
 
ny Farmony, Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders v. Pussycat Cinema, 12 J. CONTEMP. L. ISSUES 
275, 277-79 (2001) (discussing that Dallas Cowboys is still good law and appropriately ana-
lyzes the intersection of First Amendment and trademark and reputational interests). 
 75. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2) (2006). 
 76. See, e.g., V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 605 F.3d 382, 385-89 (6th Cir. 
2010); Kraft Foods, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 948-56; Ford Motor Co. v. Lapertosa, 126 F. Supp. 
2d 463, 466-67 (E.D. Mich. 2001); Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Akkaoui, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1836, 1838 
(N.D. Cal. 1996); Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q. 124, 135 (N.D. Ga. 
1981). 
 77. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Intellectual Property: Some 
Thoughts After Eldred, 44 Liquormart, and Bartnicki, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 697, 732-39 (2003); 
see also Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational Basis 
for Trademark Protection, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 789 passim (1997). 
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The depiction of marks in a sexual context has often been held to dilute 
those marks by tarnishment. In fact, many courts have suggested that references 
to marks made in the context of obscenity, sex, or crime constitute per se dilu-
tion.78 Despite the statute’s silence on the issue, the Sixth Circuit concluded in 
V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley that the Trademark Dilution Revision Act 
of 2006 created a “rebuttable presumption, or at least a very strong inference 
that a new mark [created by the defendant] used to sell sex related products is 
likely to tarnish a famous mark if there is a clear semantic association.”79 The 
court suggested that even if a use that was sexual in nature was simply “offen-
sive-to-some,” the defendant would have the burden to prove a virtually impos-
sible negative—that the use was not likely to dilute.80 The Sixth Circuit con-
ceded that there was no evidence other than an association with sex to establish 
a likelihood of tarnishment. Nevertheless, the defendant was saddled with the 
burden to contradict the “res-ipsa-loquitor-like” effect of associating any mark 
with sex.81 Needless to say, the defendant could not make such a showing.82 
The Sixth Circuit’s seemingly unjustifiable burden shifting and per se 
treatment of uses in a sexual context was based in part on its reading of the Re-
statement (Third) of Unfair Competition and in particular the Restatement’s 
third illustration in its section on dilution. The illustration provided that: 
 
A, a bank, uses the designation “Cookie Jar” to identify its automatic teller 
machines. B opens a topless bar across the street from A under the trade name 
“Cookie Jar.” Although prospective customers of A are unlikely to believe 
that A operates or sponsors the bar, B is subject to liability to A for 
tarnishment under an applicable antidilution statute if the customers are likely 
to associate A’s mark or A’s business with the images evoked by B’s use.
83 
 
The Restatement used the illustration not to demonstrate that sex was per se 
tarnishing, but instead to demonstrate that dilution could be shown without re-
 
 78. See Moseley, 605 F.3d at 385-89; Pfizer, 652 F. Supp. 2d at 525; Kraft Foods, 205 
F. Supp. 2d at 948-49; Mattel v. Internet Dimensions, Inc., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d 1620, 1627 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000); Polo Ralph Lauren L.P. v. Schuman, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1046, 1048 (S.D. Tex. 
1998); see also Ford Motor Co., 126 F. Supp. 2d at 466 (“Courts uniformly have held . . . 
that the use of a famous trademark in a domain name used to purvey pornography constitutes 
dilution.”).  
 79. 605 F.3d at 385. The Trademark Dilution Revision Act was passed with the ex-
press purpose of overruling an earlier decision by the Supreme Court in which the court held 
that plaintiffs needed to establish actual dilution rather than a mere likelihood of dilution. 
The 2006 revision changed the standard to one of likely dilution and made a number of other 
changes to federal dilution law, including expressly adding tarnishment to the definition of 
dilution. See Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730.  
 80. Moseley, 605 F.3d at 389. 
 81. Id.; see also id. at 391-95 (Moore, J., dissenting).  
 82. Id. at 388-89. 
 83. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25 cmt. g (citing Cmty. Fed. Sav. & 
Loan Ass’n v. Orondorff, 678 F.2d 1034 (11th Cir. 1982)). 
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gard to likely confusion. There is no statutory or other support for the proposi-
tion that no additional evidence need be shown by plaintiffs to establish likeli-
hood of dilution other than a reference to sex. The Sixth Circuit’s conclusion, 
however, is not entirely unfounded. The court picked up on the common trend 
of using topless bars and strip clubs as exemplars of tarnishing uses.84 No 
court, however, has provided any evidence or even explanation of why such us-
es are in fact likely to tarnish a plaintiff’s mark.  
Other examples from the case law demonstrate dilution law’s sex negativi-
ty. In Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Productions, Inc., a district court found, after 
a bench trial, that an artist’s rendering of the Pillsbury Dough Boy and Dough 
Girl—Poppin’ Fresh and Poppie Fresh—engaged in sexual intercourse and fel-
latio in a pornographic magazine called Screw diluted Pillsbury’s trademark 
rights in those characters.85 (See Figure 2.) The court held that consumers were 
not likely to be confused by the use of these characters.86 Nevertheless, the 
court concluded that the use of the marks in a sexualized manner was likely to 
“dilute the distinctive quality” of the plaintiff’s marks and “injure [the compa-
ny’s] commercial reputation.”87 
 


















 84. See, e.g., Ty, Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 2002) (referring to a 
“striptease joint” called Tiffany as an exemplar of what it means to dilute a mark by 
tarnishment). 
 85. 215 U.S.P.Q. 124, 125-26 (N.D. Ga. 1981). 
 86. Id. at 129-34 (rejecting infringement claims).  
 87. See id. at 135 (finding a violation of Georgia’s anti-dilution statute). 
 88. Photocopy from Screw Magazine, at 2 (Dec. 19, 1977), available to scholars and 
students in Intellectual Property Teaching Resources, Georgetown Law (image on file with 
author). 
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Similarly, a court issued a preliminary injunction concluding that a defend-
ant’s use of a mark similar to Kraft’s Velveeta for processed cheese was likely 
to dilute Kraft’s Velveeta because of the sexual content on the defendant’s web-
site.89 The defendant, Stu Helm, alleged that he had used the nickname King 
VelVeeda for seventeen years and signed his artwork with that name. Helm is a 
graphic artist and ran two websites, one at the web address www 
.cheesygraphics.com, where he continues to advertise his services as a graphic 
artist,90 and another at www.courtofporn.com, which contained more sexually 
explicit materials. These websites made a number of references to cheese and 
cheesiness—in the sense of his artwork being tacky or low-brow, rather than it 
being an edible milk-based product. Some of the illustrations on Helm’s web-
sites included naked women or women in suggestive poses and some depicted 
sexual activity. The court concluded that irreparable harm would befall Kraft if 
consumers associated its Velveeta cheese with sex. Because the court dismissed 
the possibility that Helm’s use of the moniker King VelVeeda was valuable, the 
balance of harms easily weighed in favor of injunctive relief.91  
The entrenched notion in dilution law that an association with something 
sexual is automatically tarnishing supports and perpetuates sex negativity. It is 
also patently absurd when the mark or product/service is already associated 
with sex. For example, a small sex toy shop called Victor’s Little Secret was 
found likely to dilute (by tarnishment) Victoria’s Secret’s mark in its store 
name, despite the larger company’s sale of lingerie and use of sexually sugges-
tive advertising campaigns.92 The Sixth Circuit concluded that the defendant’s 
mark—which was not confusing—might tarnish the larger company’s mark be-
cause it was “sex related.”93 It is a classic example of the law sitting in judg-
ment of what constitutes “good” sex. Victoria’s Secret, which unquestionably 
treats women as sexual objects, scantily clad in underwear, represents “good” 
sex, while a store that sells vibrators that those same women might enjoy “tar-
nishes” the “wholesome” image of sex that Victoria’s Secret tries to con-
struct.94 Playboy also has made successful dilution arguments that associations 
with “hardcore” porn sites tarnish its high-brow, soft-core porn reputation.95 
Similarly, a federal district court thought the association of Viagra with an at-
 
 89. Kraft Foods Holdings, Inc. v. Helm, 205 F. Supp. 2d 942, 948-49 (N.D. Ill. 2002). 
 90. For the current version of the website and information on the defendant Stu Helm, 
see www.cheesygraphics.com. 
 91. Kraft Foods, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 948-57.  
 92. See V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 605 F.3d 382, 394 n.4 (6th Cir. 2010) 
(Moore, J., dissenting) (describing Victoria’s Secret’s sexually suggestive marketing cam-
paigns). 
 93. Id. at 385. 
 94. See id. at 391-95 (Moore, J., dissenting); see also Victoria’s Cyber Secret Ltd. 
P’ship v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 161 F. Supp. 2d 1339 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (finding dilution 
of Victoria’s Secret mark because of an association with adult entertainment websites). 
 95. See, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Tex. 
1997). 
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tractive woman sitting astride a missile tarnished the image of the erectile dys-
function drug.96 It is confounding how encouraging people to have sex tarnish-
es the image of a drug intended to facilitate sex. It is also telling that in other 
non-sexual contexts, courts have suggested that making something seem low-
brow and contrary to a plaintiff’s upscale reputation is not dilutive, yet in the 
context of sex such associations have been considered relevant.97 Thus, dilution 
law perpetuates a sex-negative message and imposes troubling distinctions be-
tween “good” and “bad” sex. 
Dilution law also runs contrary to everything advertising agencies know. 
Rather than discouraging purchases, sex often sells.98 So an association with 
sex might often be a plus for businesses. Far from harming sales of products, 
causing consumers to (consciously or subconsciously) associate a product or 
service with sex might actually enhance sales and the image of the underlying 
products. Nevertheless, courts make unsubstantiated conclusions to the contra-
ry. The Sixth Circuit, for example, concluded that an association between a fa-
mous mark and “lewd or bawdy sexual activity disparages and defiles the fa-
mous mark and reduces the commercial value of its selling power. This 
consensus stems from an economic prediction about consumer taste and how 
the predicted reaction of conventional consumers in our culture will affect the 
economic value of the famous mark.”99 Yet, neither this court nor any other 
that I have found has cited any evidence that this effect in fact occurs. It is pos-
sible that associations with certain types of sex (perhaps “hardcore” or uncom-
mon sexual practices) would discourage purchases, but no such evidence has 
ever been discussed in dilution cases. Even the TTAB has admitted that the 
scandalousness of a mark may actually generate more interest in a product or 
service.100 This confounding state of affairs suggests that the tarnishment con-
clusion may revolve more around efforts to channel sex into accepted, sani-
tized, and controllable forms instead of around efforts to protect trademark 
holders from negative repercussions of sexual associations with their marks. 
Not only is a finding of dilution much more likely in the context of sexual-
ly explicit references to trademarks, but the usual array of defenses that make 
enforcement of dilution a rarity have sometimes been disfavored in the context 
 
 96. Pfizer, Inc. v. Sachs, 652 F. Supp. 2d 512, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 97. See, e.g., Paco Sport, Ltd. v. Paco Rabanne Parfums, 86 F. Supp. 2d 305, 329 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (asserting that perfume company cannot complain that defendant’s sale of 
clothing interferes with its “carefully crafted upscale image,” but suggesting that if there had 
been a sexual reference that conclusion might be different).  
 98. Although there are no definitive studies, a number of studies suggest that sex is 
both a frequent and useful advertising technique. Association with sex increases interest in 
advertisements and some studies have shown that it increases the likelihood that consumers 
will purchase the advertised goods. See, e.g., Tom Reichert, Sex in Advertising Research: A 
Review of Content, Effects, and Functions of Sexual Information in Consumer Advertising, 
ANN. REV. SEX RESEARCH 241 passim (2002) (surveying relevant studies).  
 99. Moseley, 605 F.3d at 388. 
100. See, e.g., In re Douglas, 2004 WL 2202264 at *5 (T.T.A.B. Sept. 7, 2004). 
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of sexually explicit uses. Dilution law raises free speech concerns and judges 
often credit defenses to dilution on the basis of these concerns. Although First 
Amendment and other defenses to dilution are frequently successful, when the 
uses at issue relate to sex, such defenses have sometimes been rejected because 
of the sexual content.101 Parody has long been a defense to trademark dilution 
and current federal law has an explicit exemption for parodies.102 Some courts, 
however, have rejected the possibility that uses of marks in a sexual context can 
form a parody or any other form of commentary or critique that would be ex-
empted from liability for dilution either via the explicit statutory exemptions or 
the First Amendment.103 There is no justification for the conclusion that paro-
dies cannot have sexual content, and such a holding cuts off a host of important 
potential commentaries. 
Some of the decisions finding dilution in sexual contexts are now suspect 
on doctrinal grounds because of a new (or more explicit—depending on your 
point of view) statutory requirement that dilutive uses be uses of a plaintiff’s 
mark as a “mark or trade name” for the defendant’s product or services. Some 
state laws, however, continue to permit dilution findings absent use as a mark 
and do not set forth an express non-commercial use defense.104 The longstand-
ing pattern of disfavoring uses in a sexual context is, therefore, likely to persist. 
 
101. See, e.g., infra note 103; see also 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 49, at § 24:89. But see 
Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 806-12 (9th Cir. 2003) (rejecting 
trademark infringement and dilution claims based on photographic art works that used Bar-
bie dolls in sexual, as well as other, contexts); Lucasfilm Ltd. v. Media Mkt. Grp., Ltd, 182 
F. Supp. 2d 897, (N.D. Cal. 2002) (rejecting dilution claim by makers of movie Star Wars 
against animated adult film Starballz because the use was a noncommercial one). I note that 
recent doctrinal changes have also shored up defenses to dilution. See infra note 104 and ac-
companying text. Nevertheless, many of these successful defenses have involved courts de-
ciding that the defendant’s use had some artistic value. Such decisions, as I will discuss, 
leave open the door for courts to impose their views about what sorts of depictions of sex are 
appropriate. See discussion infra Parts III.A.6 & III.C.  
102. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A)(ii) (2006); 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 49, at § 24:90. 
103. See, e.g., Dall. Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 
200, 205-07 (2d Cir. 1979) (dismissing the possibility of parody, fair use, or First Amend-
ment defenses in the context of a use of a mark in a pornographic film); Kraft Foods Hold-
ings, Inc. v. Helm, 205 F. Supp. 2d 942, 953-54 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (rejecting a parody defense 
in the context of sexually explicit content); Archdiocese of St. Louis v. Internet Entm’t Grp., 
Inc., 34 F. Supp. 2d 1145 (E.D. Mo. 1999) (rejecting the possibility that a pornographic web-
site set up in association with the Pope’s visit to St. Louis could be a parody). 
104. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 14247 (West Ann. 2008) (not explicitly re-
quiring defendant to use another’s mark as a trade name or mark); ILL. COMP. STAT.                 
§ 1036/65 (West 2011) (same); see also 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 49, at §§ 24:67-24:122 
(discussing state and federal law prior to the 2006 amendment to federal dilution law and 
then the requirement of use as a trademark under federal law after that amendment). 
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II.  COPYRIGHT’S PURPORTED MOVE TOWARD INDIFFERENCE ABOUT 
SEX AND MORALITY 
While trademark law has continued to explicitly discriminate against marks 
and uses with sexual content, copyright law has largely moved away from ex-
plicit discrimination. Copyright law is a constitutionally authorized mechanism 
to protect original works of authorship from being copied, distributed, dis-
played, performed, and more recently from having derivative works made 
without the permission of the copyright owner.105 The conventional wisdom 
today is that copyright law no longer concerns itself with the underlying mo-
rality or legality of works when determining their eligibility for copyright.106 
The actual law is somewhat more opaque, however, with many jurisdictions 
leaving open the possibility that copyright law could continue to exclude works 
judged immoral or illegal, especially works with sexually explicit material. 
Even absent such exclusions, several copyright doctrines unintentionally lead to 
“thin” protection for pornography—similar to that for phonebooks or other fac-
tual compilations. Most significantly, fair use analysis leaves ample room for 
courts to impose sex exceptionalism, negativity, and normativity. In this Part, I 
will begin with a historical analysis of copyright’s treatment of sex and then 
consider the current state of the law.  
A. Historical Limits on the Copyrightability of “Immoral” Works 
It is useful to consider the historical treatment of works with sexual content 
because some courts continue to follow these rules, others leave open the pos-
sibility of their continued viability, and even if defunct, the analysis in individ-
ual cases is telling about how judges use their own moral views about sex to 
mete out the benefits and burdens of copyright. These cases, though antiquated, 
demonstrate the biases of the time—some of which persist. I will discuss these 
cases below. Taken together, they demonstrate discomfort with nudity and fe-
male sexuality—a discomfort that continues in fair use analyses and in trade-
mark law today. 
At common law, copyright law denied copyright protection to works 
deemed, inter alia, immoral, illegal, fraudulent, or blasphemous.107 Works with 
 
105. Copyright is governed by federal law pursuant to the Copyright Act of 1976 and 
subsequent amendments to that act. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. (2006).  
106. BRUCE KELLER ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW § 2:7:3 (2010); MELVILLE NIMMER & 
DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §§ 1.03, 2.17 (2011). 
107. See BALL, supra note 4, at 67-68, 112-13, 720; BOWKER, supra note 4, at 86-87; 
DRONE, supra note 4, at 181-98; HINKSON, supra note 4, at 1-2, 8, 71 (citing Southey v. 
Sherwood, 35 Eng. Rep. 1006 (1817)) (“There can be no property in works of an immoral 
nature, or which are likely to have an injurious influence . . . .”); WEIL, supra note 4, at 22, 
195-96 (“The rule that there can be no copyright in any blasphemous, seditious or immoral 
or libelous work rests in sound principles of public policy . . . .”); Phillips, supra note 4, at 
138. 
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sexual content were often deemed immoral.108 In his classic nineteenth-century 
treatise, Eaton Drone described three requirements for copyrightability: first, 
that the work is “innocent” and not “injurious to public peace or morals”; se-
cond, the familiar requirement that it is original; and finally, that it contributes 
to “useful knowledge.”109 Only the second requirement consistently remains 
today, but both the first and third requirements were traditionally used to bar 
copyright protection for works with sexual content. Such works were deemed 
contrary to public peace and morals, as well as devoid of any useful 
knowledge. Early statutory copyright regimes also denied copyright to sexually 
suggestive works on the basis that they were immoral.110 
One of the most well-known early cases from England denying copyright 
protection on the basis of immorality refused to extend copyright protection to 
a memoir by a courtesan. The denial of copyright was based in part on the al-
leged sexual content of the work.111 The “immorality” of the work stemmed in 
large part from the fact that the memoir was about a courtesan—the memoir 
itself is far from sexually explicit and from a contemporary perspective, does 
not even seem sexually suggestive.112 
A number of American cases also denied copyright protection to works 
deemed sexual in nature. In 1898, a U.S. District Court denied copyright pro-
tection to a song, “Dora Dean,” because the lyrics referred to a woman as the 
“hottest thing you ever seen.”113 The narrator of the song expressly wanted to 
marry Dora Dean, so the disapproval of the song was focused solely on the 
“obscene and vulgar” connotations of the word “hottest.”114 The court defined 
“hottest” (using a dictionary) as a term to describe a “lustful, lewd, [and] lech-
erous” woman.115 The court could have viewed the word as suggesting that she 
was attractive but instead put a negative spin on the sexy nature of the woman 
and concluded that this “immoral signification” justified the denial of copy-
right.116 
Findings of immorality were also common when there was nudity or simp-
ly the suggestion of it. A play that showed women in various states of undress 
was deemed likely to “corrupt the morals of people.”117 Accordingly, copyright 
 
108. Phillips, supra note 4 passim. 
109. DRONE, supra note 4, at 181-82. 
110. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Le Traunik, 209 F. 375, 379 (N.D.N.Y. 1913). 
111. Stockdale v. Onwhyn, [1826] 108 Eng. Rep. 65 (K.B.); see also DRONE, supra 
note 4, at 185-86. The court also suggested that the memoirs might be libelous (she named 
names) which formed a separate basis to deny copyright protection at that time. See Stock-
dale, 108 Eng. Rep. at 66-67. 
112. See HARRIETTE WILSON, MEMOIRS OF HARRIETTE WILSON (1825). 
113. Broder v. Zeno Mauvais Music Co., 88 F. 74, 74, 78 (N.D. Cal. 1898). 
114. Id. at 78-79; BERT WILLIAMS, Dora Dean (Broder & Schlam 1895), available at 
http://www.traditionalmusic.co.uk/songster/50-dora-dean.htm.  
115. Broder, 88 F. at 79. 
116. Id.  
117. Martinetti v. Maguire, 16 F. Cas. 920, 922 (C.C. Cal. 1867) (No. 9,173). 
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protection was denied.118 Another play which included an on-stage costume 
change by the lead actress (behind a screen) was judged lascivious in nature 
and thereby outside the protections of the Copyright Act.119 In 1958, the Attor-
ney General wrote an opinion letter acknowledging the continued denial of 
copyright protection to immoral and obscene works and concluding that the 
Register of Copyright could also deny registration to such works.120 Although 
much has changed in our tolerance of depictions and descriptions of sex, this 
historical treatment of sex in copyright continues to inform our current law. 
B. Copyright Law Today—See No Evil? 
The dominant view of today’s copyright law is that obscene and porno-
graphic works are capable of receiving copyright protection and equitable theo-
ries such as unclean hands do not prevent the enforcement of copyright in such 
instances. This view has been expressly adopted by both the Fifth and the Ninth 
Circuit Courts of Appeals.121 The D.C. Circuit and a number of district courts 
in other circuits have cited these decisions with approval, but have not made 
any specific holdings on the matter.122 Commentators therefore often claim that 
copyright today no longer concerns itself with whether works are obscene, por-
nographic, or otherwise sexually explicit for purposes of protectability and also 
does not care about such judgments when considering whether a use is fair.123  
This conventional wisdom and the reality, however, are somewhat different 
from one another. Despite the consensus that the morality and sexual content of 
 
118. Id. at 923. 
119. Barnes v. Miner, 122 F. 480, 489-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1903). I note that the court in 
Barnes suggested that the defendant might not have infringed the work even if copyrighted, 
but the bulk of the opinion analyzes why the plaintiff’s work was not deserving of copyright 
protection. 
120. Copyrights—Denial of Registration of Claims Because of Content, 41 Op. Att’y 
Gen. 395 (1958). Despite suggesting the legitimacy of such denials, the Attorney General 
noted that the review process and probable appeals of such denials were likely to be so ad-
ministratively burdensome as to weigh against the adoption of such a review process. 
121. See Jartech, Inc. v. Clancy, 666 F.2d 403 (9th Cir.1982); Mitchell Bros. Film Grp. 
v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1979); see also Dream Games of Ariz., Inc. 
v. PC Onsite, 561 F.3d 983, 990-92 (9th Cir. 2009) (stating that the illegal or immoral status 
of the underlying work is irrelevant for determinations of copyrightability or its enforce-
ment); Belcher v. Tarbox, 486 F.2d 1087 (9th Cir. 1973) (rejecting argument that plaintiff’s 
work did not deserve copyright protection because it was fraudulent). 
122. See Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102, 112 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (citing Mitchell 
Brothers with approval for the proposition that the preamble to the Progress Clause does not 
limit congressional power); Nova Prods., Inc. v. Kisma Video, Inc., 2004 WL 2754685, at 
*2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2004) (agreeing with the analysis from Mitchell Brothers that ob-
scene works could receive copyright protection). 
123. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., Inc., 1981 WL 1402, *9, *11 n.10 
(N.D. Ga. Dec. 24, 1981) ); see also supra note 106. But see Rebecca Tushnet, My Fair La-
dies: Sex, Gender, and Fair Use in Copyright, 15 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 273 
(2007) (contending that courts now favor sexual content in fair use determinations). 
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a work no longer matters, remnants of the earlier exclusions and aesthetics seep 
through in fair use and other copyright considerations. Additionally, some 
judges continue to suggest that there may be an exception to copyright for ob-
scene works.124 The issue remains an open one in all circuits except the Fifth 
and Ninth, and the Supreme Court has not addressed the question. Even when 
courts accept the copyrightability of sexually explicit works, they have some-
times disfavored works with sexual content when determining the scope of 
copyright protection and also when evaluating claims of fair use by defendants. 
It is to these pockets of sex negativity, normativity, and exceptionalism that I 
now turn. 
C. Lingering Sex Exceptionalism and Sex Normativity in Copyright 
The stability of the existing law is unclear since most federal circuit courts 
have not made holdings on the question of whether pornographic (or other 
“immoral”) works merit copyright protection and a number of courts have ex-
pressly suggested that such an exception to copyright may persist. Moreover, 
legislators and scholars have made repeated calls over the years to use copy-
right law to discourage pornography and obscenity. A number of copyright 
doctrines, such as originality and fair use, also can disfavor works with sexually 
explicit content. I will look in more detail at each of these pockets of lingering 
differential treatment of sex or at least of disfavored forms of sex. 
1. Continued limits on protectability 
Although two federal circuits have concluded that there is no longer a bar 
to copyright protection for obscene, pornographic or immoral works, some 
courts continue to suggest that immoral and obscene works sit outside copy-
right’s purview,125 and most federal circuits have not considered the question. 
This leaves open the door to restrict copyright for works with sexual content. 
Such an event is not too far-fetched given both recent and longstanding advo-
cacy urging the elimination of copyright protection for pornographic works,126 
 
124. See, e.g., Devil Films, Inc. v. Nectar Video, 29 F. Supp. 2d 174, 175-77 (S.D.N.Y. 
1998) (questioning availability of copyright protection for obscene works and denying order 
of seizure and preliminary injunction to adult film company on the basis that courts should 
not exercise their equitable powers and resources to assist those who produce obscene 
works); see also Liberty Media Holdings, LLC v. Swam Sharing Hash File, No. 11-10802-
WGY, at 4, n.2 (D. Mass. Oct. 31, 2011) (noting that whether pornography is protected by 
copyright law is an open question in the First Circuit); United States v. Stagliano, 693 F. 
Supp. 2d 25, 33 n.11 (D.D.C. 2010) (suggesting post-Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 
(2003), that copyright law could exclude obscene works from its purview). 
125. See, e.g., supra note 124. 
126. See, e.g., Ann Bartow, Pornography, Coercion, and Copyright Law 2.0, 10 VAND. 
J. ENT. & TECH. L. 799, 831-34 (2008) [hereinafter Bartow, Coercion and Copyright]; Phil-
lips, supra note 4 passim (describing the longstanding prohibition on copyrighting obscene 
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and an increasing interest in looking back to the common law for contemporary 
guidance.127 
Even absent an explicit exclusion for immoral, obscene, or pornographic 
works, existing doctrines limit the copyrightability of sexually explicit works 
and provide a narrow scope of copyright protection to such works. These doc-
trines do not single out sexual content, but in combination lead to thin copy-
right protection for works that are primarily composed of sexual activities. 
Originality, for example, is a requirement for copyrightability; however, it is 
challenging to establish the originality of sex acts and courts can be dismissive 
of the inventiveness of particular depictions of sex.  
Other copyright doctrines such as the merger doctrine and scènes à faire 
further limit the scope of protection afforded to sexually explicit works.128 The 
merger doctrine precludes copyright protection when there is only one (or a 
very few ways) to express a particular idea—in such instances the expression 
merges with the relevant idea; because ideas are not copyrightable, neither is 
the merged expression.129 One well-known case involving merger held that the 
idea of a jewel-encrusted bee pin could only be expressed in one way and there-
fore the defendant’s “copy” did not use any protectable elements.130 In the con-
text of pornography, the expression of fellatio or a “cum shot” might similarly 
be considered to merge with those “ideas,” such that no one could enforce cop-
yright over a particular sexual act.  
Scènes à faire are common elements that necessarily flow from the choice 
of a particular setting or genre. If plot devices or types of characters, for in-
stance, are considered stock, generic features in a genre, then they will be non-
protectable scènes à faire. For example, in a work about a superhero, scenes 
that depict the superhero performing “feats of miraculous strength,” wearing a 
 
and/or immoral works); Kurt L. Schmalz, Note, Problems in Giving Obscenity Copyright 
Protection: Did Jartech and Mitchell Brothers Go Too Far?, 36 VAND. L. REV. 403 (1983); 
Ann Bartow, Copyright Law and the Commoditization of Sex (May 11, 2011) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1825946 [hereinafter 
Bartow, Copyright Law and Commoditization]. 
127. Recent calls from scholars to incorporate more of the common law of copyright 
might unwittingly lead us down a path toward such prohibitions. See, e.g., INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., forthcoming 2012); 
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Pragmatic Incrementalism of Common Law Intellectual 
Property, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1543 (2010). 
128. I note that there is a split of opinion over whether these doctrines are more proper-
ly defenses to infringement or if instead they limit the scope of copyright protection in the 
first instance. See Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1082 (9th Cir. 2000) (hold-
ing that these doctrines are defenses to infringement); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 106,    
§ 13.05 (noting the conflicting views and advocating for the doctrines being defenses). For 
my purposes, the difference is not important because in practice even when asserted as a de-
fense these doctrines ultimately limit the scope of the copyright that can be enforced. 
129. Dunlap v. G & L Holding Grp., 381 F.3d 1285, 1295 (11th Cir. 2004); see also 17 
U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006). 
130. Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971). 
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“tight-fitting acrobatic costume[],” “fight[ing] wealthy megalomaniacal vil-
lains,” or propelling himself into flight are all unprotectable scènes à faire.131 
In the context of pornography, a possible example of a scène à faire is the 
common trope of a delivery person arriving with a pizza box and staying on for 
a sexual encounter.  
Putting together the requirement of originality, and the doctrines of scènes 
à faire and merger, we rarely see courts finding copyright infringement in the 
context of pornographic works outside of exact copying. Such limits may well 
be appropriate but unquestionably mean that works that are primarily composed 
of sexually explicit content are likely to have very narrow copyright protection. 
Thus, calls to deny such works protection seem both unnecessary and primarily 
focused on conveying an anti-sex message. 
2. Fair use and the hidden doctrine of copyright dilution 
Sex exceptionalism most often percolates up in today’s copyright law when 
courts analyze the fair use defense to copyright infringement.132 The fair use 
provision of the Copyright Act specifically provides an exception to copyright 
infringement when works are used for certain “purposes such as criticism, 
comment, news reporting, teaching . . . scholarship, or research.”133 These 
enumerated examples in the preamble to the fair use section are not exhaustive 
but provide preferred zones of uses. When evaluating pornographic works, 
courts often dismiss the possibility that pornography could fall into any of these 
categories. Works that incorporate others’ copyrighted works into something 
with sexual content therefore have often been held unfair. 
  Until recently, courts have dismissed the possibility that sexually explicit 
works could have any communicative impact other than a sexual one and have 
dismissed the possibility that sexual content itself can carry important social 
commentary.134 Yet, even pornography that ostensibly is targeted only at sexu-
al arousal (a value that itself should merit greater credit) can carry meaningful 
messages. For example, gay porn has been described by some in the communi-
ty as liberating, affirming, educational, and in service to the disruption of dom-
inant narratives of sexuality that presume heterosexuality.135 
 
131. Warner Bros. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 654 F.2d 204, 209-10 (2d Cir. 1981). 
132. According to the terms of the Copyright Act, a fair use does not constitute an in-
fringement of a copyright. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). Courts and litigants, however, often 
treat fair use as a defense to infringement. For the sake of simplicity, I will sometimes also 
refer to it as a defense. 
133. Id. 
134. See, e.g., Dall. Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 
200, 205-06 (2d Cir. 1979). 
135. See, e.g., Michael Lucas, On Gay Porn, 18 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 299 passim 
(2006). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2104419
ROTHMAN_VA EDITS.NSD (DO NOT DELETE) 6/14/2012 10:31 AM 
146 STANFORD LAW & POLICY REVIEW [Vol. 23:1 
Not only have courts dismissed the potential of sex to provide important 
commentary, but as part of assessing fair use, courts also have made overall as-
sessments of the worthiness of a particular use. The Ninth Circuit, for example, 
has treated the fair use analysis as one that interrogates the “propriety” of the 
use.136 Such an evaluation could lead to a conclusion that uses judged immoral 
or obscene would not qualify for fair use because they would be deemed im-
proper.137 Even if such uses are acceptable, the law often places no value (or a 
negative value) on sex. Therefore, when the worth of the use is balanced 
against the interests of copyright holders, sex (and the defendants) often lose. 
Even when courts faithfully apply the fair use factors set forth in the stat-
ute, rather than make broader judgments about the worthiness of a given use, 
the factors themselves provide great judicial latitude to determine what quali-
fies as fair. The four non-exclusive fair use factors are: (1) the purpose and 
character of the use (including whether it is a commercial or nonprofit use); (2) 
the nature of the original copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of 
the portion used; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or 
value of the copyrighted work.138 The first and fourth factors are usually the 
most influential, and in the context of sexual content often weigh heavily 
against fair use.  
The first factor—the purpose and character of the use—provides great lati-
tude for courts to disapprove of the type of use made of the work. As discussed, 
when pornographic works are at issue, courts often discount the worthiness of 
the use. In addition, the first factor calls for an evaluation of whether a use is 
commercial. Commerciality is not determinative of fair use but it does weigh 
against it. Pornographic works and other sexually explicit works are often sold 
for profit. They accordingly are almost uniformly considered commercial in na-
ture.  
Courts also consider in the first factor whether a use is a “transformative” 
one.139 In a broad sense, transformative uses are those that recast, alter, or 
comment on the original. What qualifies as transformative in practice is more 
confounding.140 There is universal agreement that parodies are transformative, 
but less agreement about what else counts.141 Because courts have sometimes 
 
136. Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 436-37 (9th Cir. 1986) (using “propriety” as a sepa-
rate factor in fair use analysis). 
137. Id. (assuming without deciding that immoral and obscene uses might be improper 
and ineligible for fair use, but concluding that the parody at issue was neither). 
138. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
139. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578-79 (1994). 
140. Additionally, the focus on transformativeness causes many courts to discount the 
significant values of non-transformative uses. For critiques of this approach, see Rothman, 
supra note 66, at 490-93, and Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine 
Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 537, 566-87 (2004).  
141. I note that despite the etymological and historical meaning of parody, courts have 
extended fair use only to parodies that comment on the original work; they routinely deny 
fair use to works that use the style of an existing work to make a broader social commentary.  
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dismissed the ability of sexually explicit content to comment on the original 
work or constitute a parody, such uses have until recently been less likely to be 
considered transformative.142 Some pornographic works, however, may be par-
ticularly transformative and important both personally and culturally. In the 
context of “transgressive” pornography—such as gay porn—this is particularly 
true because the works comment on and disrupt the standard narratives about 
sex. 
The fourth fair use factor—the effect of the use on the copyrighted work’s 
market or the copyrighted work’s value—has also been wielded against de-
fendants who have used others’ works in a sexual context. Harm to the plain-
tiff’s markets weighs heavily against a finding of fair use. Because some courts 
have concluded that the association of a copyrighted work with a sexually ex-
plicit or pornographic use will lead consumers to think less favorably of the 
original work, such uses sometimes have been treated as having a negative 
market effect on the underlying work (and its derivatives).143 This analysis is 
akin to trademark dilution, which protects the strength of marks from being 
whittled down either by blurring (the creation of multiple associations in the 
minds of consumers) or by tarnishment (the creation of negative associations 
with the mark).144  
Copyright law does not have an explicit doctrine of dilution, but we see 
something similar to dilution permeating fair use analysis, particularly in cases 
involving sex. A couple of scholars have recently noticed (and criticized) sev-
eral forms of such “copyright dilution.”145 Copyright dilution views uses that 
potentially “tarnish” the image of the original less favorably. As in the context 
of trademark dilution, uses in the context of sex are often treated as presump-
tively tarnishing.146 
A few specific examples demonstrate how these fair use factors have been 
interpreted against defendants who use works in sexual contexts. In MCA, Inc. 
v. Wilson, the Second Circuit rejected a fair use defense for a song titled the 
 
142. See supra notes 64-68 and infra notes 147-170 and accompanying text. But see 
Tushnet, supra note 123, at 275-91 (suggesting that after Campbell, 510 U.S. 569, courts 
have swung the other direction and now often conclude that all sexual uses are transforma-
tive with little further analysis). See discussion infra notes 164-170 and accompanying text. 
143. See, e.g., Dall. Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 
200, 205-07 (2d Cir. 1979). I note that there is a dispute about whether the market impact on 
derivative works is an appropriate consideration in the market effects analysis. 
144. See discussion supra Part I.C. 
145. See, e.g., Barton Beebe, Intellectual Property Law and the Sumptuary Code, 123 
HARV. L. REV. 809, 859-62 (2010) (discussing aspects of “antidilution law” in copyright that 
serve to protect the rarity and uniqueness of works); Christina Bohannan, Copyright Harm, 
Foreseeability, and Fair Use, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 969, 1023-27 (2007) (criticizing “copy-
right dilution” and courts’ unreasonable consideration of reputational harm in context of fair 
use analysis). 
146. See supra Part I.C. 
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“Cunnilingus Champion of Company C.”147 The song was viewed by the court 
as a “take-off” of the copyrighted song “Boogie Woogie Bugle Boy.”148 When 
considering the purpose and character of the use and the market effect, the 
court focused on the value that society would gain from the use versus the harm 
to the copyright holder of the use.149 In such analyses, sexually explicit or sug-
gestive uses fare poorly. Despite the majority’s purported consideration of each 
of the fair use factors, the court’s distaste for the song undoubtedly colored its 
analysis. The court pointedly suggested that the “dirty lyrics” were used for 
commercial gain and dismissed the value of the “end result[.]”150 But as Judge 
Mansfield appropriately noted in his dissent, “We cannot, under the guise of 
deciding a copyright issue, act as a board of censors outlawing X-rated perfor-
mances. Obscenity or pornography [should] play no part in this case.”151  
In addition, although the court in Wilson concluded that the work was not a 
parody, reasonable minds could disagree about this conclusion. Mansfield’s 
dissent contended that the use was a “fair and limited use in a reasonable man-
ner . . . to produce what amounts to a sexual satire or burlesque of contempo-
rary mores by putting a comic or humorous twist on the more conventional Bu-
gle Boy and by parodying the Andrews Sisters’ style.”152 Mansfield noted that 
only “one short phrase” from the plaintiff’s lyrics was used in the defendant’s 
work and that only the boogie-woogie style, rather than the actual musical 
composition had been used.153 He also questioned the majority’s unsubstantiat-
ed conclusion that the defendant’s use would harm the market for the origi-
nal.154   
The Ninth Circuit in Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates also rejected a 
fair use defense when the defendants used sacred American icons, the Disney 
cartoon characters, in scenes involving drugs and sex.155 The defendants 
claimed that they were parodying the wholesomeness of the Disney charac-
ters.156 Contrary to other parody analyses, the court dismissed the need to use 
the characters in order to parody them, claiming that too much of the likenesses 
of the cartoon characters had been taken for the parody.157 It has struck many 
commentators, including me, that this case is wrong as a matter of fair use and 
 
147. 677 F.2d 180, 182-86 (2d Cir. 1981). 
148. Id. at 184. 
149. Id. at 182-86. 
150. Id. at 185. 
151. Id. at 191 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). 
152. Id. at 188 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). 
153. Id. at 190 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). 
154. Id. at 188-91 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). 
155. 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978). 
156. Id. at 756-59. 
157. Id. 
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free speech law.158 The Air Pirates case is therefore often viewed as an outlier, 
a fair use misstep. But I contend that it is not—it is part of a group of cases that 
involve defendants’ uses of copyrighted works in sexual contexts. They may all 
be wrongly decided, but they form a historical pattern of disfavoring fair use in 
the context of sex, even after the purported move away from doing so. 
In Walt Disney Productions v. Mature Pictures Corp., a district court in 
New York again protected Disney characters from the dreaded sexual innuen-
do.159 The court rejected a fair use claim for the use of music from the Mickey 
Mouse Club television show in a movie titled The Life and Times of the Happy 
Hooker.160 The music played in the background of a sex scene containing three 
male actors and one woman. The men were wearing Mouseketeer hats and ap-
parently celebrating either one or all of their birthdays. The defendant filmmak-
ers claimed that they used the music to “highlight and emphasize the transition 
of such teenagers from childhood to manhood . . . in a highly comical set-
ting.”161 The music and the hats signaled their childhood in contrast to the sex 
act that took place. The court discounted any possible parody as the entire orig-
inal work was used, even though courts have suggested in nonsexual contexts 
that broad latitude must be given for parodists to conjure up and comment on 
the original.162 Moreover, the court’s real issue was revealed in its expressed 
concern that the use would “immediately compromise” Disney’s original work 
because of the association with the pornographic film.163 The concern was not 
whether there was a colorable parody, but instead whether the use would tar-
nish Disney’s image. 
 Since the mid-1990s and the Supreme Court’s fair use decision in Camp-
bell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. that emphasized the role of transformativeness in 
fair use analysis,164 courts have increasingly moved away from disfavoring 
sexual content in fair use determinations. Although it is difficult to make over-
all assessments of the state of the current law because there have been few pub-
lished cases over the past fifteen years that have addressed sexual content (par-
 
158. See, e.g., NEIL NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 19, 29, 33, 42-43 (2008); Wendy 
J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural 
Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1602-03 (1993). 
159. 389 F. Supp. 1397 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
160. The Life and Times of the Happy Hooker (Mature Pictures 1974) was an “adult” 
film starring the legendary porn star John Holmes, immortalized in Boogie Nights (New Line 
Cinema 1997). 
161. Mature Pictures, 389 F. Supp. at 1398. 
162. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579-89 (1994) (sug-
gesting that 2 Live Crew could take a substantial amount of music and lyrics from Roy Orbi-
son’s Pretty Woman, including the heart of the song, for use in its parody); cf. Sony Corp. of 
Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449-50 (1984) (concluding that reproduc-
tion of an entire work does not weigh against fair use in the context of home taping). 
163. Mature Pictures, 389 F. Supp. at 1398. 
164.  510 U.S. at 583 (holding that 2 Live Crew’s rap song was a parody of Roy 
Orbinson’s Oh, Pretty Woman). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2104419
ROTHMAN_VA EDITS.NSD (DO NOT DELETE) 6/14/2012 10:31 AM 
150 STANFORD LAW & POLICY REVIEW [Vol. 23:1 
ticularly that of an explicit nature) there does appear to be increasing tolerance 
of sex in the context of copyright’s fair use analysis. In particular, courts have 
begun to recognize that some sexual content can be transformative.165 Courts 
have also shifted to a view that the markets for sexually suggestive or explicit 
uses and those for the original works are distinct, as well as to a view that pos-
sible market harm caused by negative associations should not be cognizable.166
 Despite what appears to be a less exceptionalist treatment of sex in recent 
years, Rebecca Tushnet has suggested that these cases taken together suggest 
another form of sex exceptionalism. She concludes that some courts now treat 
references to sex as presumptively transformative without engaging in more de-
tailed analysis.167 Professor Tushnet hypothesizes that this different though 
more favorable treatment may result from some judges’ discomfort with sex.168 
Courts may therefore avoid engaging with sexual content; rather than rejecting 
such uses outright as they used to do, some courts now are accepting them out-
right. To the extent that courts continue to treat sex differently—even if better 
than other categories—an exceptionalist system remains. The legal discourse 
therefore continues to demonstrate discomfort with sex in ways that either un-
reasonably elevate or degrade sex. 
 These recent cases do not demonstrate a complete retreat from the sex neg-
ativity and normativity of the past—not only for the reasons that Professor 
Tushnet identifies, but also because these more “sex-positive” cases have been 
limited in nature. They have primarily involved unrealistic depictions of sex 
(e.g., animated pornography), or been situated in contexts that courts consider 
“artistic” (e.g., photographs by an artist whose works were shown in major art 
galleries), or both.169 In addition, these more favorable fair use decisions pri-
marily have been decided in the Ninth Circuit, which has often been more ac-
cepting of sexual content than many other circuits. 
 It is possible that these more “sex-positive” cases do demonstrate a move-
ment toward greater acceptance of sexual content in fair use analysis. In fact, 
several cases decided in the last couple of years suggest that at least some judg-
es have become comfortable analyzing sexual content and now treat sex with 
 
165.  See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 801-03 (9th Cir. 
2003) (artist’s use of Barbie doll in “sexualized” contexts was transformative); Burnett v. 
Twentieth Century Fox Film Grp., 491 F. Supp. 2d 962, 967-69 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (holding 
that the use of the Charwoman character, associated with Carol Burnett, in a scene in a porn 
shop in the animated television series Family Guy was a transformative parody); Lucasfilm 
Ltd. v. Media Mkt. Grp., Ltd., 182 F. Supp. 2d 897, 901 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (holding that sex-
ually-explicit animated parody of Star Wars titled Starballz likely was protected by fair use); 
see also Tushnet, supra note 123, at 275-91. 
166. See, e.g., Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d at 804-06; Burnett, 491 F. Supp. 2d 
at 971-72. 
167. See Tushnet, supra note 123, at 271-91. 
168. Id. at 274. 
169. See supra note 165. 
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greater neutrality—avoiding knee-jerk acceptance or rejection.170 Neverthe-
less, sex exceptionalism and normativity are likely to continue to arise in fair 
use analyses today and in the near future even if less frequently than they have 
in the past. 
 In sum, despite copyright’s purported blind-eye toward sex, sexual content 
continues to influence the scope of copyright; the malleability of fair use in par-
ticular leaves open the door for individual courts to interpret fair use against 
defendants who produce sexual content.  
III.  RETHINKING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY’S TREATMENT OF SEX 
As demonstrated in Parts I and II, IP law contributes to a problematic legal 
construction of sex. Sex exceptionalism, negativity and normativity lead courts 
and lawmakers to treat sex (or certain types of sex) differently than other activi-
ties. In the context of IP, even though patent, copyright, and trademark laws 
have all moved away from the days of denying wholesale protection for objects 
like sex toys and works and marks that address sexual matter, underlying anti-
sex or sex-normative judgments continue to percolate up, particularly in copy-
right and trademark laws. Trademark law disfavors marks of a sexual or sexual-
ly suggestive nature, and both trademark and copyright law have disfavored de-
fendants who use marks or copyrighted works in a sexual context. 
In this Part, I will present a number of reasons why we should reject calls 
to return to the more explicit discrimination against works with sexual content 
and reasons why even the more subtle forms of discrimination that persist today 
should be recognized, rather than overlooked, and rooted out of the system. I 
will begin by discussing reasons within the IP framework to discourage such 
sex exceptionalism, negativity, and normativity. I will then turn to situating this 
discussion in the larger context of the law’s role in constructing sex. In particu-
lar, I will focus on how IP laws devalue sex and serve to channel sex into par-
ticular limited, state-sanctioned forms. 
A. IP-Specific Justifications for Sex Neutrality 
A number of considerations internal to IP law suggest the impropriety of 
treating sex differently from other categories of works or marks, or distinguish-
ing between different types of sex. Some reasons not to consider sexual content 
in evaluating IP matters stem from statutory interpretation. For example, early 
copyright statutes protected only limited subject matter. Some courts relied on 
 
170. See, e.g., LaChapelle v. Fenty, 2011 WL 2947007, at *5-*7, Exhibits A-D (July 
20, 2011) (rejecting fair use defense at motion to dismiss stage in context of sexually-
charged S & M video by pop star Rihanna). The court here, in contrast to some that Professor 
Tushnet identifies, engages in a detailed analysis of the sexual content of the relevant music 
video in its substantial similarity analysis. 
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language in the then-governing copyright acts to exclude works with sexual 
content because the works were judged as mere “spectacle” or solely of a pruri-
ent nature, rather than as “dramatic composition[s]” that merited copyright pro-
tection.171 Subsequent copyright acts broadened the copyright privilege to “all 
writings.”172 As a result, some courts have concluded that there is no longer an 
exclusion for immoral, obscene, or illegal works.173  
In this Subpart, I will focus not on these minutiae, but rather on broader 
principles of trademark and copyright law that suggest that maintaining and/or 
increasing sex exceptionalism and normativity runs contrary to many founda-
tional principles of these bodies of law. I will consider how the preference for 
nationwide uniformity and uniformity over time weigh in favor of leaving 
questions of morality, particularly in the sexual context, out of IP adjudications. 
Consideration of other goals undergirding both trademark and copyright law 
also disfavor making distinctions on the basis of sexual content. Such bans or 
limits on sexual content also are likely to be ineffective. Finally, sex normativi-
ty requires aesthetic judgments that have largely been disfavored in IP law, es-
pecially in copyright. I will address each of these considerations in turn. 
1. Uniformity and federal preemption and primacy 
Federal IP law, especially copyright, strives to provide uniform laws across 
the country that further innovation, knowledge, and business development and 
growth. Since 1976 copyright laws have been entirely federal in nature and 
state laws in the area have been preempted. Trademark law, in contrast, permits 
continued state legislation in the area; nevertheless, the federal registration sys-
tem fosters and supports federal uniformity and federal trademark law domi-
nates legal disputes that revolve around marks.  
To the extent that protectability or registrability turns on whether works or 
marks are deemed obscene (thus losing First Amendment protection), such de-
terminations are based on the standards of the relevant locale. The Miller test 
for determining whether a work is obscene specifically depends on local 
“community standards” to determine whether a work “appeals to the prurient 
interest.”174 If courts rely on such evaluations when determining 
 
171. Barnes v. Miner, 122 F. 480, 491-93 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1903); Martinetti v. Maguire, 16 
F. Cas. 920, 922 (C.C.D. Cal. 1867) (No. 9,173). 
172. See Mitchell Bros. Film Grp. v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 854 (5th Cir. 
1979). 
173. See, e.g., id. at 854-65. 
174. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). The Miller test provides three factors 
for courts to consider: (1) “whether the average person, applying contemporary community 
standards would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest”; (2) 
“whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifi-
cally defined by the applicable state law”; and (3) “whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks 
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.” Id. 
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copyrightability, trademarkability, or to determine infringement, dilution, or 
defenses to those claims, then we could see contradictory decisions depending 
on the jurisdiction. For example, a work held not obscene in New York City 
and accordingly protected by federal copyright law in that state could be freely 
copied in Oklahoma City where it might be judged obscene. This would defeat 
copyright protection on the basis of the mores of the most conservative com-
munities. Even if obscenity were not the benchmark, what is deemed porno-
graphic or immoral on the basis of sexual content will likely differ from region 
to region leading to disparate decisions and protections. Such a result would 
defeat the goals of national uniformity and, as I will discuss, undercut many of 
the goals behind copyright and trademark law, such as promoting progress and 
protecting consumers. 
2. Changing social mores 
Not only do social mores, whether related to sex or not, change from re-
gion to region, but they change over time. Given the lengthy copyright term, 
this means that a work once judged scandalous because a woman changed cos-
tumes behind a screen on stage could soon become quaint, but by that time the 
work would have been cast out into the public domain and the author or copy-
right holder would have lost the protections that copyright provides. There is a 
long list of great works that were once banned as obscene only later to be cele-
brated as literary classics or great works of art.175 In the trademark context, a 
determination that a mark is scandalous or immoral (and therefore 
unregisterable) may allow others to use the same mark. Such an occurrence 
could cause the loss of nationwide priority and make it more difficult, if not 
impossible, to enforce rights against some junior users even if the senior mark 
later becomes socially acceptable.176 To the extent that we subsequently find 
the marks unproblematic we will be unable to undo the damage to a business’s 
goodwill caused by its inability to register its mark and to establish nationwide 
priority.  
Recalling some of the banned works of the past, the change in what is ac-
ceptable is dramatic. The song “Dora Dean,” once denied copyright protection 
for using the word “hottest” to describe a woman, now seems tame and inno-
cent when compared to some of today’s hit songs, such as Enrique Iglesias’s 
“Tonight (I’m Fuckin’ You)” and Cee Lo Green’s “Fuck You.”177 And calling 
women “hot” is almost de rigueur in contemporary pop music. The Pussycat 
 
175. See Mitchell Bros. Film Grp., 604 F.2d at 857 (providing such a list). 
176. As discussed, the denial of registration does not prevent a mark from being pro-
tectable under federal or state law. It will, however, make it more likely that others can use 
the same marks in limited geographic areas. 
177. BERT WILLIAMS, Dora Dean (Broder & Schlam 1895); ENRIQUE IGLESIAS, Tonight 
(I’m Fuckin’ You), on EUPHORIA (Universal Republic 2010); CEE LO GREEN, Fuck You, on 
THE LADY KILLER (Elektra 2010). 
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Dolls’ grammatically troubling, but hardly scandalous song, “Don’t Cha,” 
trumpets the sex appeal of the singer by taunting her audience: “Don’t cha wish 
your girlfriend was hot like me!”178 Rihanna’s 2006 hit, “Break It Off,” makes 
things more explicitly sexual with her call to “make me hot all over my 
body.”179 No court would deny copyright protection to these songs today, even 
if the exclusion for “immoral or obscene” works were resurrected. Yet, once 
cast into the public domain works cannot regain their copyright.180 The authors 
and copyright holders of these works will therefore lose all rights to profit from 
them, to control how they are used, and to authorize derivative works based 
upon them. 
3. Fiction of state endorsement 
One of the most frequently posited justifications for limiting copyright and 
trademark protection for sexually explicit works or marks is that the govern-
ment should not give any state support or sanction to them. This argument is 
unconvincing. The state no more approves of individual porn films than it does 
issues of the comic book Spawn or issues of the magazine Martha Stewart Liv-
ing. When I read something particularly offensive or simply drecky, I do not 
think “how could the copyright office have registered this?” I might question 
the judgment of the publisher or whomever had recommended the book to me, 
but not the government. In the context of trademark registrations, there is great-
er review by the USPTO of marks before they are registered than there is by the 
Copyright Office of works; nevertheless, consumers still are not likely to think 
that the registration of a mark indicates government approval of that mark or of 
the underlying product or service.  
The much stronger signaling takes place when courts evaluate whether a 
work has too much sexual content or an inappropriate kind of sex and therefore 
does not merit copyright protection. Similarly, the rejection of a trademark reg-
istration on the basis of immorality or scandalousness takes place after an ex-
tended review and scrutiny of the mark. This sends a clear message of the gov-
ernment’s views about sex and particular types of sex or ways of talking about 
or depicting sex. Evaluating the legitimacy of various uses of others’ works or 
marks in a sexual context allows the government (via the courts) to set forth its 
vision of appropriate sex and the appropriate place(s) for sex. By prohibiting 
pornographic works and marks, the state’s endorsement and disapproval of 
 
178. PUSSYCAT DOLLS, Don’t Cha, on PCD (A & M 2005) (emphasis added). 
179. RIHANNA, Break It Off, on A GIRL LIKE ME (Def Jam 2006) (emphasis added). 
180. I note that restoration from the public domain may not be impossible. For example, 
some copyrights have been restored to conform with international treaties. The constitution-
ality of these restorations was recently upheld by the Supreme Court. See Golan v. Holder, 
132 S. Ct. 873 (2012). Despite the decision in Golan, works are not resurrected from the 
public domain absent a specific statute. Moreover, restoration should be disfavored because 
parties rely on a work’s public domain status when creating new works.  
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content is buoyed rather than disrupted. Supporters of prohibitions on copyright 
and trademark protection for sexual content might approve of such indications 
of government disapproval; however, as I have discussed and will further de-
velop, significant harms flow from such state-sanctioned channeling of sex. 
4. Promotion of progress, incentives and disincentives 
Another of the primary justifications for excluding immoral or obscene 
works from copyright protection is the conclusion that such works do not pro-
mote progress and therefore either are not appropriate beneficiaries of the copy-
right privilege or, at the extreme, are constitutionally barred from copyright 
protection pursuant to the terms of the Progress Clause.181 This interpretation 
of the Progress Clause is problematic. First, the language in the clause is an ex-
planation of purpose—to promote progress—not a mandate.182 Second, this 
underlying goal of copyright and patent law applies to the body of law, not to 
individual works.183 Courts are not supposed to judge the merits of individual 
works to decide whether a particular work promotes progress. Not only would 
such a task be a fool’s errand, but it would leave decidedly too much discretion 
to courts to act as taste-makers, and to some degree censors, in every context. 
Also, such an approach could have a significant chilling effect on authors, forc-
ing them to stay in safe zones to demonstrate that their works are furthering 
progress. Such an effect would ultimately undercut the fundamental goal of 
promoting progress.  
Moreover, and of particular relevance to this discussion, why should sexual 
content not be viewed as promoting progress? As I will discuss in Subpart B, 
providing greater space for discussions and depictions of various forms of sex 
ultimately does promote progress in significant ways. Sexually explicit works 
may not be at the top of everyone’s list of works that increase our stockpile of 
knowledge, but discussions and depictions of sex are decidedly important.184 
 
181. See Barnes v. Miner, 122 F. 480, 489-93 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1903); Martinetti v. 
Maguire, 16 F. Cas. 920, 922-23 (C.C.D. Cal. 1867) (No. 9,173); cf. LAW, supra note 4, at 
123 (explaining that “immoral,” “mischievous,” “frivolous,” and “injurious” inventions are 
not useful and therefore not patentable). I use the term Progress Clause rather than copyright 
clause or IP clause because the word “progress” actually appears in the clause. See U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”). 
182. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 209-17 (2003) (rejecting “Copyright Clause” 
argument that the Copyright Term Extension Act is unconstitutional because it fails to pro-
mote progress).  
183. Although the incentive rationale for copyright law is front and center in the Consti-
tution, it is important to note that there are many other rationales for copyright protection, 
including labor-reward and personality-based theories. See Jennifer E. Rothman, The Ques-
tionable Use of Custom in Intellectual Property, 93 VA. L. REV. 1899, 1948, 1948 n.179 
(2007). 
184. See discussion infra Parts III.B., III.C. 
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Watching people have sex or reading about sex promotes progress significantly 
more than, for example, a manual on how to kill someone or build a bomb, both 
of which are afforded copyright protection.  
Another frequently posited and related justification for the denial of copy-
right and trademark protection in the context of sex is to discourage the produc-
tion of works and marks with sexual content. As I will discuss, the goal of dis-
couraging works and marks that relate to sex perpetuates and creates sex 
negativity. It also furthers the questionable goal of channeling sex into certain 
forms deemed preferable by the state. But even putting such normative objec-
tions to the side, there is no reason to think that limits on copyright and trade-
mark protection actually will discourage production; in some instances the lack 
of IP protection may in fact increase the dissemination of the purportedly of-
fending materials.  
As an initial matter, receiving copyright protection does not greatly incen-
tivize the production of pornography. As discussed, pornographic works cur-
rently receive fairly thin copyright protection; yet, pornography has long been a 
productive and profitable business. Pornography flourished even when it was 
expressly denied copyright protection; even today in the context of the Internet, 
where copyright enforcement is rare, pornography proliferates.185 The types of 
pornographic works being made might change without copyright protection—
potentially for the worse—but that’s a different issue.186 Additionally, some 
have questioned whether copyright provides much of an incentivizing effect in 
any context.187 Accordingly, for those concerned that providing copyright pro-
tection might incentivize the “wrong type” of works, the incentivizing effect is 
likely to be quite small.  
On the other hand, denying copyright protection and trademark protection 
to works and marks deemed pornographic or immoral may actually increase 
their dissemination. Such denials not only provide free advertising and promo-
tion, which will generate increased consumer interest, but such denials also 
make the works and marks more freely available to copy and disseminate.188 
 
185. Bartow, Coercion & Copyright, supra note 126, at 136; Christopher Cotropia & 
James Gibson, The Upside of Intellectual Property’s Downside, 57 UCLA L. REV. 921, 961-
66 (2010). 
186. Cf. Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, Copyrighting Porn: A Guest Post, 
FREAKONOMICS (May 5, 2010, 12:00 PM), http://freakonomics.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05 
/05/copyrighting-porn-a-guest-post (describing how the proliferation of pornography online 
and the difficulties of enforcing copyright online will likely alter the type of pornography 
that gets made). 
187. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in 
Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970); Kal Raustiala 
& Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual Property in 
Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687 (2006). 
188. Cf. Belcher v. Tarbox, 486 F.2d 1087, 1088 n.3 (9th Cir. 1973) (noting in the con-
text of an allegedly fraudulent work, the illogic of the argument that when we do not want to 
promote a certain type of work, we will permit it to be freely copied). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2104419
ROTHMAN_VA EDITS.NSD(DO NOT DELETE) 6/14/2012 10:31 AM 
2012] SEX EXCEPTIONALISM IN IP 157 
Less copyright protection for sexual content may actually increase exposure to 
such works because they are free to be copied. Similarly, in the context of 
trademarks, we see the same likely effect of limiting the protection of marks 
with sexual content. The lack of registrability or even protectability (if the law 
were so changed) would make it easier for more businesses (rather than fewer) 
to adopt the “offending” mark because more competing businesses would be 
free to use the mark, particularly in geographically remote areas.  
At the same time, denial of registration does not prevent the use of marks. 
Trademark laws (both federal and state) still enforce the rights of unregistered 
marks. If an explicit or suggestive term like “The Bearded Clam” is attractive 
to seafood restaurants, they may continue to adopt it without regard to registra-
tion. To the extent that a mark indicates source in a given area, the mark holder 
will still be able to enforce trademark rights via federal unfair competition law 
and state law.  
Moreover, denial of trademark registration will likely not affect the public 
interest in particular marks or the underlying businesses. In fact, salacious 
marks often generate more interest and the publicity emanating from denials of 
registration may only build such interest. People want to drink a beer with a 
logo showing a frog flipping people off or go to a restaurant with a name that 
refers to women’s breasts. Such activities may be even more sought after if the 
government tells people that the names or logos of such businesses are scandal-
ous. 
Furthermore, at least in the context of copyright, the denial of copyright 
protection may actually harm the very performers that some anti-pornography 
scholars, such as Ann Bartow, are concerned about.189 Margaret Radin has 
raised the problem of such a “double bind” in the context of her consideration 
of a ban on prostitution. By prohibiting prostitution, we may force some indi-
viduals to engage either in less profitable and less appealing work or to engage 
in prostitution in circumstances in which they make less and are more likely to 
be mistreated.190 The same might be true for performers in a porn world with-
out copyright law. Without the protections of copyright, the industry will likely 
make works with more sex and less plot because there will be no need to have 
any copyrightable content. The works—because they can be freely copied—
may also make less money leading to performers being paid less. The work it-
self and the working conditions therefore may be less satisfying for many per-
formers if copyright protection is denied to such works. 
 
189. See Bartow, Coercion & Copyright, supra note 126, at 101-06, 113, 118-26, 137-
40; Bartow, Copyright Law & Commoditization, supra note 126, at 2, 34-38, 43-45. 
190. Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1915-17 
(1987). 
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5. Consumer protection and other trademark goals 
Trademark law protects consumers from deceptive business practices, in 
particular the passing off of one’s goods as those of another or another’s goods 
as one’s own. Trademark law therefore facilitates the identification of the 
source and/or sponsorship of goods and services. By so protecting a business’s 
goodwill, trademark law makes it more likely that consumers will have more 
products and services to choose from and that these products/services will be of 
a consistent and high quality. The secondary goal of trademark law is to protect 
a business’s goodwill; this aspect of trademark law has greatly expanded in re-
cent years, often overshadowing the consumer protection rationale.191 Denying 
registration to marks deemed scandalous or immoral, however, furthers none of 
these goals. In fact, if anything the goals are defeated by such denials because 
without registration it is more likely that consumers will be confused by com-
peting marks and competitors will have greater difficulty knowing what marks 
are available.  
For example, the denial of the registration for the mark Bearded Clam led 
to many Bearded Clam restaurants around the country. Consumers might think 
they are related to one another, when in fact they are not. Moreover, the public 
is not protected from encountering the purportedly scandalous mark in the mar-
ketplace—if anything they are likely to see it more often because the priority 
trademark holder will have a more limited ability to prevent others from using 
the mark outside of its bounded geographic area and others will be more likely 
to adopt the mark thinking it is available for use. 
6. Discouragement of aesthetic evaluations 
Copyright law has long discouraged judges from making aesthetic evalua-
tions.192 The Fifth Circuit in Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Thea-
ter concluded that copyright protection should be extended to pornographic 
works in part because to do otherwise would force judges to make disfavored 
 
191. This is most notably evident with the expansion and adoption of dilution law and 
the initial interest confusion doctrine. See Rothman, supra note 52 passim. 
192. BALL, supra note 4, at 107-10 (suggesting that a work does not need artistic or lit-
erary value to merit copyright protection, but noting that the work must be of some societal 
value); HINKSON, supra note 4, at 2, 9 (“[To be property it] need not be of any ascertainable 
value, but it must be original.”). Another well-known critique of judges making aesthetic 
evaluations in the context of copyright law comes from Lord Campbell. Campbell criticized 
his fellow judge Lord Eldon’s decision to deny copyright protection to a poem by Lord By-
ron because Lord Eldon concluded that the work was blasphemous. Campbell considered it a 
“strange occupation for a judge who for many years had meddled with nothing more imagi-
native than an act of Parliament, to determine in what sense the speculations of Adam, Eve, 
Cain, and Lucifer are to be understood, and whether the tendency of the whole poem be fa-
vorable or injurious to religion. ” LORD CAMPBELL, 10 LIVES OF THE LORD CHANCELLORS 
AND KEEPERS OF THE GREAT SEAL OF ENGLAND FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TILL THE REIGN OF 
KING GEORGE IV 257 (5th ed. 1868), quoted in DRONE, supra note 4, at 187-88 n.2. 
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evaluations of the “aesthetic and educational” value of works.193 The Mitchell 
Bros. court quoted Justice Holmes and his famous language from Bleistein v. 
Donaldson Lithograph, Co. In the context of concluding that lithographs used 
as advertisements were deserving of copyright protection, Holmes observed 
that “[i]t would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law 
to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, out-
side of the narrowest and most obvious limits.”194  
Despite such longstanding views, aesthetic evaluations are sometimes una-
voidable in copyright law. Aesthetics have played a role in determining origi-
nality and substantial similarity.195 Defenses to copyright and trademark in-
fringement, and trademark dilution also often turn on aesthetic judgments. For 
example, copyright’s fair use defense considers the purpose and character of a 
use; a work judged artistic in nature will be considered both worthwhile and 
transformative—qualities that both weigh in favor of fair use. When consider-
ing First Amendment defenses to trademark infringement and dilution, courts 
also often favor uses deemed artistic in nature.196 One such example is the 
Rogers test that explicitly favors uses of another’s trademark when the use has 
“artistic relevance.”197  
In the context of sex, aesthetic evaluations have played a particularly sig-
nificant role in determining both the protectability of marks and works, as well 
as the legitimacy of uses of those marks or works. Works or uses that are sex-
ually explicit will frequently be viewed as having little to no artistic value, 
making infringement findings and other unfavorable conclusions more likely. 
Moreover, consideration of what is artistically valuable often devolves into a 
question of whether the sex itself is appropriate.  
 
193. 604 F.2d 852, 856 (5th Cir. 1979) (quoting Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithograph Co., 
188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903)). See also Belcher v. Tarbox, 486 F.2d 1087, 1088 (9th Cir. 
1973) (“There is nothing in the Copyright Act to suggest that the courts are to pass upon the 
truth or falsity, the soundness or unsoundness, of the views embodied in a copyrighted work. 
The gravity and immensity of the problems, theological, philosophical, economic and scien-
tific, that would confront a court if this view were adopted are staggering to contemplate.”). 
 194. Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251. Recent work by Rebecca Tushnet has focused attention 
on the “pictorial” aspect of the decision, but courts have long relied on Holmes’ opinion for 
the broader proposition that judges should refrain from making aesthetic judgments in the 
copyright arena. Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright Law, 
125 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm 
?abstract_id=1911352. 
195. See Christine Farley, Judging Art, 79 TUL. L. REV. 805, 806-09, 819, 827-30, 833-
36 (2005); Alfred C. Yen, Copyright Opinions and Aesthetic Theory, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 247, 
247-52, 266-302 (1998). 
196. See, e.g., ETW, Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 924-28 (6th Cir. 2003).  
197. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999, 1001 (2d. Cir. 1989) (holding that Federico 
Fellini’s movie title Fred and Ginger was protected by the First Amendment because the 
title was artistically relevant to the underlying work and not explicitly misleading as to 
source). Although the Rogers test initially only applied to titles, it now applies to all uses in 
“works of artistic expression.” Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Grp., 886 
F.2d 490, 495 (2d Cir. 1989). 
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To the extent that protectability or a defense turns on classifying a work or 
use as obscene, courts are explicitly required to evaluate the artistic value of the 
underlying works or marks. The Miller test used to determine whether works 
are obscene and fall outside of First Amendment protection expressly considers 
whether the relevant work has “serious literary, artistic, political or scientific 
value.”198 If it does, then the First Amendment protects the work from govern-
ment censorship.  
Even when courts do not look to obscenity law, evaluations of what 
works/marks (or uses of those) are deserving of protection or are immoral or 
scandalous will frequently turn on aesthetic judgments. Determinations of 
whether works with sexual content are “immoral,” for example, have often re-
lied on such artistic evaluations. In Martinetti v. Maguire, a California district 
court denied copyright to a play because of its evaluation of the quality of the 
work: “The principal part and attraction of the spectacle seems to be the exhibi-
tion of women in novel dress or no dress, and in attractive attitudes or action     
. . . . To call such a spectacle a ‘dramatic composition’ is an abuse of language, 
and an insult to the genius of the English drama.”199 Although the basis for the 
denial of protection was that the work did not promote progress because it did 
not “encourage virtue and discourage immorality,”200 the above analysis 
demonstrates that the judge’s literary tastes were at the heart of the determina-
tion. Similarly, in Barnes v. Miner, the court assessed the primary “idea and 
purpose” of the play as to display the human being in “nude or seminude condi-
tions making quick changes of dress or costume.”201 The court analyzed the di-
alogue and found it wanting.202 Another of the classic early cases afforded 
copyright to a work with an interracial sex scene despite the bar against provid-
ing copyright to immoral works, but the court emphasized in so concluding that 
the work at issue had some basis in “actual conditions”—suggesting that at 
least one consideration in evaluating the morality of works is whether they are 
“true” or based on reality, as opposed to purely creations of an author’s imagi-
nation.203 Similarly, uses of trademarks in the context of works deemed artistic 
are more likely to be protected by the First Amendment or a fair use defense.
204
 
Because evaluations of works, marks, and uses of those with sexual content 
often involve aesthetic considerations, much room is left not only for problem-
 
198. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). 
199. 16 F. Cas. 920, 922 (C.C.D. Cal. 1867) (No. 9,173). 
200. Id. 
201. 122 F. 480, 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1903). 
202. Id. at 490. 
203. Simonton v. Gordon, 12 F.2d 116, 124 (S.D.N.Y. 1925). 
204. Compare Dall. Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 
200, 205-07 (2d Cir. 1979) (rejecting defenses to a use of a mark in a pornographic film) 
with Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 806-12 (9th Cir. 2003) (protect-
ing uses of a mark even in a sexual context when the uses were in photographs made by a 
known artist). 
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atic judgment calls about what constitutes “art,” but also about what constitutes 
acceptable portrayals of sex. Such evaluations permit judges to hide their biases 
about sex behind the cloak of artistic evaluations, which are disfavored in and 
of themselves. 
B. Valuing Sex  
The law often treats sex differently (and worse) than other activities or as-
pects of human identity because courts treat sex as if it lacks any value unless it 
serves other goals, such as procreation, or marital or emotional intimacy.205 As 
discussed, legal scholars and jurists routinely dismiss the value of sex in the 
context of IP adjudications and elsewhere.206 Both trademark and copyright 
law have disfavored works, marks and uses that depict sex or simply nudity. 
Trademark law continues to deny registration to marks with sexual content, es-
pecially marks that refer to sexual intercourse, genitalia, or masturbation, or 
that show nudity, and trademark dilution law treats references to sex as per se 
tarnishing.207 
Such devaluations of sex make it more likely that uses of works or marks 
in a sexual context will be found infringing or dilutive and that no defense will 
protect them. For example, if not for the sexual content, the “Cunnilingus 
Champion of Company C,” the use of Disney cartoon characters in Air Pirates, 
and the use of Mouseketeer hats in a film would all be good candidates for fair 
use. The rejection of the fair use claims in each instance was based on an antip-
athy toward sex and a view that associations with sex would be harmful to the 
underlying copyrighted works.208 Evaluations of whether an injunction (prelim-
inary or otherwise) should issue or the legitimacy of First Amendment and fair 
use defenses all turn on the balancing of the plaintiff’s interests with the public 
interest in permitting the defendant’s use. When trademark and copyright hold-
ers’ rights are on one side of the scale and on the other are purportedly value-
less or harmful activities, users do not stand a chance.  
Despite the frequent sex-negative discourse, there are many reasons to val-
ue sex more affirmatively in the legal system. Sex can be something pleasura-
ble, self-defining, and empowering whether cabined into an intimate relation-
ship or not and regardless of whether any particular end is served.209 A positive 
relationship to sex promotes self-love, love of others, identity-development, 
care, pleasure, self-esteem, commitment, community, and intimacy.210 Greater 
 
205. Rosenbury & Rothman, supra note 1, at 809-18, 824-36. 
206. Id. at 818. 
207. See discussion supra Part I. 
208. See discussion supra notes 147-163 and accompanying text. 
209. Rosenbury & Rothman, supra note 1, at 811, 836-38, 848. 
210. Id. at 858. 
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comfort with sex and the ability to act as sexual subjects also can lead to im-
proved mental and physical health.211  
Not only do courts and advocates of limiting IP protection for pornograph-
ic works devalue and stigmatize sex directly, but they also do so indirectly by 
treating sex as more harmful than violence and bigotry. Ann Bartow, for exam-
ple, wants to carve out an exception to copyright law for sexually explicit 
works, but does not address the fact that protection remains for works that are 
violent, racist, homophobic, or that depict animal cruelty.212 Such confounding 
sex exceptionalism was recently showcased in the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n.213 In Brown, the Court held uncon-
stitutional, on First Amendment grounds, a ban on selling violent video games 
to children. Bans on sales of sexually explicit materials, however, remain. Jus-
tice Stephen Breyer dissented from the decision noting the “serious anomaly” 
that it created: “[W]hat sense does it make to forbid selling to a 13-year-old boy 
a magazine with an image of a nude woman, while protecting a sale to that 13-
year-old of an interactive video game in which he actively, but virtually, binds 
and gags the woman, then tortures and kills her. What kind of First Amendment 
would permit the government to protect children by restricting sales of that ex-
tremely violent video game only when the woman—bound, gagged, tortured, 
and killed—is also topless?”214 Putting aside whether such bans should be 
permitted, we should be concerned about our society’s and legal system’s dis-
approval of sexual content and nudity, especially when compared to its ac-
ceptance of violence and animal cruelty.215  
C. Sex Normativity and Judging the “Appropriateness” of Sex 
Even when IP law permits discourse about sex to be protected under its 
umbrella, it often picks and chooses preferred forms of sex. Instead of 
 
211. Id. at 844 (citing Lucia F. O’Sullivan et al., To Your Sexual Health! Incorporating 
Sexuality into the Health Perspective, in HANDBOOK OF GIRLS’ AND WOMEN’S 
PSYCHOLOGICAL HEALTH 192, 194 (Judith Worell & Carol Goodhearts eds., 2006)). 
212. I note that Professor Bartow has suggested at times that instead of banning all cop-
yright protection, the copyright office could require proof of consent of all performers in 
pornographic works before registering them and granting copyright protection. If consent is 
demonstrated, copyright registration and protection would then be extended. Bartow allows, 
however, for performers to withdraw their consent at any time—something that would not be 
extended outside the realm of pornography. See Bartow, Coercion & Copyright, supra note 
126. Her more recent work on the subject, however, calls for a broader ban on copyright pro-
tection for pornographic works judged “non-progressive” and “non-useful.” See Bartow, 
Copyright Law & Commoditization, supra note 126. My focus here is not on the specifics of 
Bartow’s or other scholars’ suggestions, but instead on broader-based claims that IP law 
should discriminate against sexual content.  
213. 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011). 
214. Id. at 2771 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
215. See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010) (striking down ban on 
depictions of animal cruelty). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2104419
ROTHMAN_VA EDITS.NSD(DO NOT DELETE) 6/14/2012 10:31 AM 
2012] SEX EXCEPTIONALISM IN IP 163 
“recogniz[ing] the diversity of sexual and intimate relations as worthy of re-
spect and protection,”216 courts have imposed their views of what constitutes 
“good sex.” IP law is therefore part of a larger network of laws that promote a 
narrow vision of acceptable sexual expression and conduct.217 These laws harm 
individuals living both within and outside their framework.218 For those who 
cannot conform to the legally and socially constructed vision of sex, the legal 
and social disapproval can cause psychological and physical harm and funda-
mentally alter their relationship to themselves, their sexuality, and their place in 
society.219 The law also discourages some, who otherwise might wish to or 
who would benefit from doing so, from departing from this dominant construc-
tion of sex. IP law and the works and marks that seek to comply with it “con-
struct the range of choices through norms of acceptable gender and sexual per-
formance.”220  
Although everyone is affected by this narrow construction of sex, certain 
groups may be particularly affected and harmed, in particular, women, gay, 
lesbian, and bisexual individuals, and those who engage in purportedly danger-
ous or commercial sex. For example, IP law can perpetuate the idea that wom-
en do not enjoy sex or only enjoy certain types of domesticated or procreative 
sex. Such disfavoring of female sexuality is common in IP law and more broad-
ly.221 As the decisions discussed in Parts I and II reveal, IP laws have some-
times expressed a vision of sex that excludes women from sexual activity. 
When copyright law excluded immoral and sexual works from its purview, the 
vast majority of the works deemed immoral portrayed female sexuality. James 
Cain’s book Serenade was granted copyright protection in part because the fe-
male character that had premarital sex in a church was later punished for her 
misdeed by being killed.222 In Barnes v. Miner, the court deemed a work “las-
civious and immoral” because the on-stage costume changes (conducted behind 
a screen) “would naturally excite passions” of the males in the audience while 
producing “disgust” among the “chaste females.”223 The non-chaste females in 
the audience, according to the judge, would have “no particular emotions what-
ever other than expectancy or curiosity” of how the play would affect the 
men.224 The judge assumed heterosexuality in his analysis and favored chaste 
women while assuming that men are sexually experienced and easily excitable. 
Courts today would analyze things differently—after all many contemporary 
 
216. WARNER, supra note 5, at 88. 
217. Rosenbury & Rothman, supra note 1, at 818. 
218. Id. at 839. 
219. Id. at 818, 839-43. 
220. Cf. id. at 839 (speaking about the intimacy model for regulating sex). 
221. Id. at 839-44. 
222. Cain v. Universal Pictures Co., 47 F. Supp. 1013, 1017-19 (S.D. Cal. 1942). 
223. Barnes v. Miner, 122 F. 480, 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1903). 
224. Id. 
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plays have naked actors parading across the stage.225 Nonetheless, the latitude 
for imposing biases and perpetuating stereotypes remains and should discour-
age us from returning to such prohibitions on the protectability of works. 
Trademark law also has disfavored references to female sexuality. A sig-
nificant number of rejected applications for marks refer to female genitalia and 
decisions about which marks to register sometimes objectify, rather than liber-
ate women. The USPTO, for example, rejected the registration of the cheekily-
named mark Bubby Trap for a bra, but did not hesitate to register the name and 
logo for the restaurant Hooters with its owl/breast logo.226 For the few who 
have not seen the logo, I have reproduced it below in Figure 3 as well as a pho-
tograph of the logo as it appears in context on servers’ uniforms. (See Figure 
4.) Even without entering the restaurant and seeing the all female wait-staff 
wearing short-shorts and very tight t-shirts, it would be difficult to miss the lit-




225. See RICHARD GREENBERG, TAKE ME OUT (2004) (earlier versions were performed 
in 2002); TERRENCE MCNALLY, LOVE, VALOR, COMPASSION (1995) (originally produced in 
1994). 
226. Compare In re Runsdorf, 171 U.S.P.Q. 443 (T.T.A.B. 1971), with HOOTERS, 
Registration No. 73464115. 
227. Hooters, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hooters#Employee_handbook   
_requirements; Barbara Kasper & Barbara Moore, WAVE’s Review of Hooters, ROCHESTER 
NOW (originally published Apr. 12, 1995), http://www.rochesternow.org/hooters.html; Max-
imum Weight/Size Requirements?, HOOTERS GIRL (July 21, 2009), http://thehootersgirl 
.blogspot.com/2009/07/maximum-weightsize-requirements.html; So You Want to Be a 
“Hooters” Girl?, THE SMOKING GUN (Sept. 15, 2005), http://www.thesmokinggun.com/file/ 
so-you-wanna-be-hooters-girl?page=7 (scanned excerpts from the Hooters Employee Hand-
book). The employee handbook observes that the concept of Hooters is based on female sex 
appeal and that to work there one must accept a certain degree of sexual innuendo and joking 
that might otherwise form a hostile work environment. Id. 
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It is possible that the reference to owls gave cover to Hooters, but a more 
troubling interpretation of this discrepancy is also possible. Using a cute refer-
ence to breasts in a product marketed to women and for use with actual breasts 
is vulgar, but objectifying women’s breasts and using them to sell hamburgers 
to men is okay. It is also possible that the decade between the two registration 
decisions led to a liberalization of attitudes toward references to breasts or that 
different examining attorneys had different views about the propriety of such 
 
228. Image filed with USPTO as part of Intent-To-Use Application, No. 85151738 (no-
tice of allowance issued, May 17, 2011), for use on goods composed of beef, chicken, pork 
and shrimp. This most recent filing is similar to other drawings registered with the USPTO, 
but best reflects the Hooters logo as used in commerce. See also HOOTERS, Registration Nos. 
1602377, 1652377, 73712461, 7364115. 
229. Photograph posted by Richard Metzger, ‘Holy Preachers’ and the Hooters Wait-
resses, DANGEROUS MINDS, (Jan. 20, 2011, 4:24 p.m.), http://www.dangerousminds.net/ 
site/comments/holy_preachers_and_the_hooters_waitresses. 
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references. Regardless of the explanation, the message conveyed is that it is 
okay to sexualize women’s breasts for men, but not for products targeted at 
women to make fun of these revered features of the female anatomy. Such mes-
sages reinforce the treatment of women as sex objects, while denying their ef-
forts to become sexual subjects. 
These biases perpetuate the sexual double standard, in which sexual desire 
and pleasure are reserved for straight men whereas women are assumed not to 
enjoy sex.230 Both societal and legal discourses provide more space for men to 
express interest in sex and sexual pleasure than for women.231 This socio-legal 
construction then both constructs and reinforces existing constructions of sex 
and appropriate sexual gender roles, restricting the liberty and/or agency of 
both men and women.232  
Not only does the constellation of IP decisions demonstrate disparagement 
of female sexuality, but it also raises the specter of disapproval of homosexuali-
ty and other less common sexual practices. Same-sex conduct is likely to be 
treated less favorably, as we have seen in criminal law and elsewhere, even af-
ter Lawrence v. Texas.233 Obscenity trials tell us that historically gay content 
has been deemed obscene and Hollywood ratings boards’ and television studi-
os’ standards and practices continue to limit references and depictions of ho-
mosexuality. Giving IP law latitude to determine acceptable sex leaves wide 
open the door to discriminate against sexual minorities, such as gay, lesbian, 
bisexual, and transgender individuals.  
For example, the Supreme Court held that a gay organization could not use 
the moniker the “Gay Olympics” for an athletic competition. This decision (un-
der a special law for the U.S. Olympic Committee similar to trademark law) 
suggests disapproval of uses of trademarks in the context of homosexuality and, 
at the very least, demonstrates a lack of awareness by the Court of the im-
portance of the word “Olympics” to communicate the legitimacy of gay ath-
letes.234 The USPTO’s bars to registration can also obstruct the ability of 
groups that have been targets of discrimination to comment on and/or subvert 
derogatory terms.235 The USPTO recently struggled to decide whether a lesbian 
motorcycle group that leads off gay pride parades could register the mark 
 
230. Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 WIS. L. 
REV. 187, 210; Rosenbury & Rothman, supra note 1, at 840. 
231. Rosenbury & Rothman, supra note 1, at 840-41. 
232. Id. at 842. 
233. See id. at 823-35, 828 n.107. 
234. S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 438 U.S. 522 (1987). SFAA 
was not strictly speaking a trademark case. Instead, the suit by the USOC was brought under 
a separate statute that protects the Olympic mark without regard to confusion. Many other 
organizations have been given permission to refer to themselves as “Olympics.” The USOC 
opposition to the SFAA’s use therefore likely revolved around the fact that it was a gay or-
ganization.  
235. Cf. Amy Adler, What’s Left?: Hate Speech, Pornography, and the Problem for Ar-
tistic Expression, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1499 passim (1996). 
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Dykes on Bikes for its organization and related merchandise. The USPTO ini-
tially rejected the registration of the mark on the basis that it disparaged a par-
ticular group and was immoral and scandalous. After scholars and the San 
Francisco City Council filed letters in support of the registration, the USPTO 
reconsidered its decision and registered the mark. The USPTO’s initial rejec-
tion of Dykes on Bikes suggests a possible disfavoring of references to gays and 
lesbians even when adopted by the in-group.  
Scholars who have advocated for limits on pornography and limits on cop-
yright protection for such works also seek to impose their views about what sex 
is acceptable. For example, anti-pornography feminists have long rejected the 
possibility that women could enjoy participating in or watching bondage.236 If 
“whips and chains excite” Rihanna and Brittany Spears, and Rihanna wants to 
make a video showing her participation in S&M (which she has done), why 
should the state step in to tell her that her expression of her sexuality is bad, in-
appropriate, and does not deserve copyright protection?237 This debate in IP 
circles evokes the sex wars between anti-pornography, anti-sex feminists and 
more sex-positive feminists and queer theorists.238 I do not have space here to 
fully recount this debate, but similar critiques can be leveled against using IP 
law to channel sex as those that have been leveled against sex-negative femi-
nism. It portrays a very narrow view of sex and gender that is ultimately con-
straining rather than liberating and empowering.239 
IP laws also have disfavored depictions of commercial sex and depictions 
of sex that are for profit. Some of the earliest cases denying copyright protec-
 
236. See ANDREA DWORKIN, WOMAN HATING 55-90 (1974); CATHERINE A. 
MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 125-228 (1987); CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD 
A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 195-214 (1989); Andrea Dworkin, Against the Male 
Flood: Censorship, Pornography, and Equality, 8 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 1 passim (1985); see 
also Bartow, Copyright Law & Commoditization, supra note 126, at 13-14, 28 (referring to 
MacKinnon & Dworkin’s draft of the Indianapolis anti-pornography law and at times seem-
ing to embrace limits on providing copyright even to consensual depictions of bondage). 
237. RIHANNA, S&M, on LOUD (Def Jam 2010). Rihanna, however, is not free to copy 
others’ work in her music videos. See supra note 170. 
238. LISA DUGGAN & NAN D. HUNTER, SEX WARS: SEXUAL DISSENT AND POLITICAL 
CULTURE passim (1995); Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Femi-
nist Legal Theory, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 304 passim (1995); Lisa Duggan, The Sex Panic: 
Women Censorship, and Pornography: An Historical Overview, 38 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 25 
passim (1993); Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and De-
sire, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 182, 197-202 (2001); Carol S. Vance, More Danger, More 
Pleasure: A Decade After the Barnard Sexuality Conference, 38 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 289 
passim (1993). 
239. See, e.g., Franke, supra note 238 passim (advocating for a positive theory of fe-
male sexuality); Nadine Strossen, A Feminist Critique of “The” Feminist Critique of Por-
nography, 79 VA. L. REV. 1099 passim (1993); see also Sallie Tisdale, Talk Dirty To Me, 284 
HARPER’S MAG. 37 passim (1992) (describing her love affair with pornography).  
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tion to works were those in which memoirs of prostitutes were at issue.240 As 
discussed, courts penalize those who seek to profit from depictions of sex. The 
opposition to mixing sex with commerce is longstanding.241 The dividing lines 
between commercial and non-commercial sex, however, are not as clear as the 
judiciary and some commentators think. Sex is already commodified (even in 
private, martial relationships) and commodification does not disrupt many of 
the privileged aspects of sex—for example, the promotion of emotional intima-
cy.242  
Another reason pornography may be disfavored is that its poorly developed 
plot lines tend to portray sex without developing connections or intimacy be-
tween the characters. This is akin to sex without intimacy—something that 
courts and society have disfavored and which they assume women find no 
pleasure in.243 Sex, however, should be valued for its own sake and for the 
pleasure and sometimes care that takes place within it without regard to any in-
strumental goals, such as procreation or relationship-building, and without dif-
ferentiating between different visions of sex. Copyright and trademark law 
should embrace all forms of sexuality—rather than limit them—and not disfa-
vor sex merely because it takes place in a commercial or paid context, nor be-
cause it involves same-sex participants or consensual bondage.  
CONCLUSION 
Despite the purported movement away from exclusions for sexually explic-
it or suggestive content, trademark and copyright law continue to exhibit sex 
exceptionalism, negativity, and normativity in a variety of ways. Nevertheless, 
I do not intend to overstate the existing limits on sexual content. Today, many 
copyrighted works have sexual content and numerous registered trademarks are 
sexually suggestive. Pornographers have successfully sued for copyright and 
trademark infringement and some defendants (including pornographers) have 
been able to use copyrighted works and/or trademarks in a sexual context with-
out losing fair use or First Amendment defenses.244 Both bodies of law, how-
 
240. See discussion supra notes 110-112 and accompanying text; see also Pornogra-
phy, DICTIONARY.COM (2011), http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/pornography (describ-
ing the etymology of the term “pornography” as writing about “harlots” (a.k.a. prostitutes)).  
241. Noah Zatz, Sex Work/Sex Act: Law, Labor, and Desire in Constructions of Prosti-
tution, 22 SIGNS 277, 283-85, 289-91 (1997). 
242. Rosenbury & Rothman, supra note 1, at 845-46. 
243. See id., passim. 
244. See, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc’ns. Corp., 354 F.3d 1020 (9th 
Cir. 2004) (permitting trademark infringement and dilution claims by adult entertainment 
website to go forward against a search engine, but in the context of advertisements for com-
peting pornography sites); L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 
1987) (finding that a sexual spoof of the L.L. Bean catalog was a parody protected by the 
First Amendment); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Megaupload Ltd., 2011 WL 3203117 (S.D. Cal. 2011) 
(rejecting a motion to dismiss a copyright infringement claim brought by the adult enter-
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ever, leave much latitude for judges to discriminate against works, marks, and 
uses of both solely on the basis of sexual content. This project has described 
some of the ways IP law continues to devalue and channel sex. This is most ev-
ident in trademark dilution law where courts have read in an explicit prohibi-
tion on using marks or colorable imitations in sexual contexts. Without a clear 
and developed articulation of why disfavoring sexual content is a problem, 
courts and legislatures could easily heed the calls of those who wish to move 
back in the direction of limiting protection for works and marks with sexual 
content.  
My critique of such an approach should not be read, however, as an en-
dorsement of all pornography or adult entertainment. Some pornography does 
degrade women (and men), involves organized crime, and/or includes non-
consenting participants. To the extent that pornography degrades, a counter-
narrative—perhaps even a pornographic one—is necessary.245 To the extent 
that organized crime is involved, criminal law enforcement should address this 
problem. To the extent performers have acted without consent or under duress, 
criminal charges are appropriate. The adult entertainment industry has also un-
derpaid its workers and failed to protect performers from contracting sexually 
transmitted diseases. Labor organizing and better safety precautions might all 
be appropriate, but none of this is properly the purview of IP law.  
Using copyright and trademark to achieve these alternative ends is destruc-
tive both to the IP system and to our broader culture. It provides yet another av-
enue for the law (and in this case art and commerce) to shape a vision of sex 
that is narrow, discriminatory, pejorative, and exclusionary. Works, marks, and 
uses of them should not be disfavored solely because they have sexual content 
nor should courts be in the business of assessing what constitutes good or bad 
sex. Ultimately, sex should be no more exceptional than other activities, and 
courts should be agnostic about the type of sex that takes place or is depicted. 
Outside of IP law, courts should continue to evaluate whether sex is consensual 
and whether sexual activities or depictions of sex are forced on a “captive audi-
ence.”246 There may also be reasons to limit the use of marks or advertising 
that is sexually explicit to protect children from seeing images that they may 
not be ready for or that their parents may not wish for them to see.  
A recalibration of IP law will not fundamentally alter our society’s rela-
tionship to sex, but it is one step in a larger project to provide more space for 
 
tainment company Perfect 10, Inc.); Lucasfilm Ltd. v. Media Mkt. Grp., Ltd., 182 F. Supp. 
2d 897 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (finding animated pornographic movie entitled Starballz a parody 
of Star Wars and concluding that copyright and trademark claims were not likely to suc-
ceed); Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q. 124, 131 & n.10 (N.D. Ga. 
1981) (permitting a fair use defense to a copyright claim in a sexual context and concluding 
that pornographic uses should not be disfavored in fair use analysis) (citing Mitchell Bros. 
Film Grp. v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1979)). 
245. Cf. Adler, supra note 235 passim. 
246. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 44 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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individuals to develop their own views and experiences of sex.247 The promo-
tion of more positive and pluralistic views and portrayals of sex is important; IP 
laws should promote frank, honest public discussions of sex, rather than penal-
ize them.  
 
 
247. See Rosenbury & Rothman, supra note 1, at 823-35, 828 n.107 (advocating for a 
constitutional right to sex). 
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